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Abstract 
A SO-item safety climate inventory based on a 40-item safety 
climate questionnaire proposed by Zohar (1980) was administered to 427 
employees of ten industrial organizations in Illinois and Wisconsin. 
1he ten extra items were added to Zohar's original questionnaire to 
explore two new dimensions; (1) workers perception of enforcement versus 
counseling, and (2) workers perception of social status. Zohar's 40 
questionnaire items were extracted fran the SO item survey and a factor 
analysis was conducted which extracted 14 factors. A canparison was 
then made between this studies sample results and Zohar's original 
results on factor position and fact.or structure (i.e., item loadings). 
Similarities were discovered between factor structures, but not between 
factor positions. 
A second factor analysis was then constructed using all SO-items, 
which again resulted in the extraction of 14 factors. Factor scores 
fran each of these 14 factors were then submitted to a linear 
discriminant function analysis to assess the discrimination between 
accident versus accident-free groups. Results indicated that only two 
factors should be retained. These factors were worker perception of 
environmental risk and perception of management's attitude toward their 
well being. Analysis of mean factor scores for the two dimensions 
revealed differences between the accident and accident-free groups, with 
the accident group demonstrating a significantly lower level of risk 
perception and management attitude perception than the accident-free 
group. 
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CHAPTER I 
IN1RODUCTION 
The purpose of this study was to distinguish through the 
utilization of confirmatory factor analysis discriminating variables and 
characteristics on which safe and unsafe workers are expected to differ. 
A unique aspect of the study was the randan selection of a total of 
approximately 80 workers fran each of eleven industrial organizations. 
The employees were selected fran two groups of employees. Group I 
included 40 randanly selected workers who had experienced one or more 
work-related accidents within the past five-year period. Group II 
consisted of 40 workers who had worked "accident free" during the past 
five years of employment. A 50 item Zohar/Holmes safety climate 
attitude inventory using the Likert Scale. was provided to the employees 
of each organization. and the questionnaires were returned to the Safety 
Studies Department at the University of Wisconsin-Whitewater on a 
voluntary basis in a self addressed envelope. A total of 427 
questionnaires were returned. Along with each questionnaire. a written 
statement was given to each worker in regard to the voluntariness and 
confidentiality of the information collected. A sample set of 
instructions was also included. (Appendix II) 
A significant assumption of the study was that discriminating 
features characterize individual organizations and that the global 
perception of these features by production workers create the safety 
climate of the particular industrial plant. In other words. the 
perceptions employees have or share about their specific work 
environment make up the occupational safety climate. Several studies 
referred to in the literature review emphasize the importance of 
employee perceptions and expectations and the subsequent effect on 
employee behavior. 
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Che of the most consistent findings in the reviewed literature was 
that in companies having successful safety programs, there was a strong 
management camiitment to safety. This camiibnent was exhibited in a 
number of ways. C.Ohen. Snith, and C.Ohen (1975), Shafai-Sahrai' (1971). 
and Zohar ( 1980), have all found that in low-accident canpanies. top 
management was personally involved in safety activities on a routine 
basis, whereas such conmibnent was conspicuously absent in high accident 
canpanies. It is clear that safety motivation has to flow fran top 
management down to the person in the shop or on the assembly line. 
Although the worker is the focal point of any safety effort. is also 
necessary to give equal attention to motivate management so that it will 
accept, encourage,' and initiate positive safety trends. An industrial 
organization, if it proposes to continue in business, must impress upon 
the employees that they are being cared for both on and off the job. 
lbwever, on-the-job care in the form of safer and cleaner work places; 
in addition, to safer machines and tools is not always viewed with the 
same enthusiasm as contract benefits because the provision of these will 
not leave the worker any happier with management. In Frederick 
Herzberg's (1975) words safety is what the employee "expects" fran 
management. 
3 
The canplacency of management, however, can be reinforced with the 
institution of a safety department leading to the belief that safety has 
''been taken care of"; at any rate, the management is equipped with a 
made-to-order scapegoat. To justify his existence, the safety officer 
could, and is perhaps expected to, try his hand at motivating the work 
force, but it is not laid down as his job responsibility that he should· 
keep motivating management. With the safety department doing its job, 
management ass\JlleS itself to be in the clear and able to pay_ full 
attention to production, investments, and returns on the one hand and 
bonuses, incentives, etc. , on the other. This is the usual accepted 
procedure. 
Organizational safety climate, as proposed in this study, could 
have both theoretical and applied significance. A major aspect of this 
study is to determine factors which could be used by employers to 
predict levels of safeness or unsafeness in the selection and assignment 
of employees to various tasks in the organization. The safety climate 
scores, when operationalized and validated, resulted in safety climate 
scores which had few similarities to Zohar's (1980) findings in Israel. 
This cross-cultural canparison became a secondary purpose of the 
research and the results are reported in the supplementary analysis. 
Limitations of The Study 
This study is limited to 427 employees of eleven industries and 
organizations in Illinois and Wisconsin. (See Appendix I). The 
sample, instn111ent and method in the study are described ih Chapter III. 
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Organization of The Study 
The remainder of the dissertation is organized into four chapters. 
nie review of the literature related to safety climate as defined by the 
perceptions employees have or share about their specific work 
environment is presented in Cha.pter II. A review of educational and 
psychological research relevant to facilitating behavior change to 
improve safety climate is also presented. 
Chapter III presents the methodology, including a description of 
the sample, the variables selected for the study, and the scales used to 
measure these variables. 
Chapter IV presents the results and includes a description of the 
statistical procedures used to test the hypotheses and the findings 
based on these tests. 
A sumJary of the results of the study and recarmendations for 
further research are presented in Chapter_V. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
'llle literature reviewed in this chapter is divided into two basic 
sections. Literature related to organizational climate is presented in 
the first section. A clear distinction is made between organizational 
climate and organizational safety climate. Organizational climate is 
based on structural properties; whereas, organizational safety climate 
deals with perceptions held by employees. 
Literature concerning various educational and psychological 
theories and their assumptions concerning behavior change is presented 
as it relates to safety climate; 
Organizational Climate 
Writers of organizational climate distinguish between specific 
climate measures, such as a climate scale (House and Rizzo, 1972) and 
holistic climate measures. Examples for such holistic climates are 
motivational climate (Litwin and Stringer, 1968), individual differences 
climate (Schneider and Bartlett, 1970) and creativity climate (Taylor, 
1972). According to climate theories, any organization creates a number 
of different climates and the term organizational climate has to be 
supplemented by an appropriate adjective indicating which type of 
climate is being addressed. Schneider (1975) proposes that the term 
"organizational climate" should describe an area of research, rather 
than a specific organizational measure. It is on this basis that the 
term "organizational safety climate" was developed. In contrast, 
measures of organizational climate are based on certain structural 
properties of organizations such as (1) size, structure, system 
canplexity, leadership style, and goal directions (Forehand & Gilmer; 
Porter & Lawler, 1964); and (2) perceptions held by employees 
(Schneider, 1973; Sells, 1968; Tagiuri, 1968). 
Organization Safety Climate 
1his study has adopted the second interpretation of organizational 
climate; namely; climate as viewed as a smmary of molar perceptions 
that safe and unsafe workers share about _their respective work 
environments. Based on a variety of cues present in their work 
environment, employees develop coherent sets of perceptions and 
expectations and behave accordingly (Dieterly & Schneider, 1974; 
Fleishman, 1953; Litwin & Stringer, 1968). 1hese coherent sets of 
organization perceptions, when shared as srnmarized for individual 
employees, are defined in this study as organizational safety climates. 
1he basic assumptions that are associated with organizational 
climate are related to Gestalt theory and functionalism theory. 1hey 
are: 
1. Htunans tend to apprehend order in their enviornment and to 
create order through thought. 
2. As humans participate in the work environment they need to 
adapt their behavior to different working conditions. 
Gestalt theory is concerned with perceiver tasks. 1his theory 
maintains that an individual attempts to apprehend the order of that 
which objectively exists in the world and through no choice of his/her 
6 
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own creates new order by a process of integration through thought. A 
person builds a total concept of order based on a set of cues. Cues are 
the outside stimuli that influence the perception. 
Fl..lllctionalism theory is concerned with the process of behavior and 
how behavior serves to help the organism adjust to environments. 1his 
concept can be broken into two basic canponents; the fl..lllctions of 
cognitive and behavior in adaptation, and the role of individual 
differences in the capacity to adapt. In this case order is perceived 
in order to adapt to the environment. 
Dimensions of Safety Climate 
In order to determine the various dimensions of safety climate, the 
review of related safety literature proved to be helpful. 1he primary 
purpose of this review was to define organizational characteristics that 
differentiate between high versus low accident-rate canpanies. It was 
assumed that such organizational features characterize individual 
industries and the global perception of these by industrial employees, 
therefore, form the safety climate of that industry. 
Che of the most consistent findings in the review of literature was 
that in industries having successful accident prevention· programs, there 
was a strong management coomitment to safety. 1his coomitment was 
exhibited in a variety of ways. Cohen, Snith, and Cohen (1975), fubley 
(Note 1) and Shafai-Sahrai (1971) have found that in low-accident 
canpanies, top management was personally involved in safety activities 
on a routine basis, whereas such coomitment was conspicuously absent in 
high-accident canpanies. Cleveland, Cohen, Snith, and Cohen (1978) and 
8 
Shafai-Sahrai (1971) have reported that in low-accident canpanies safety 
matters were given high priority in company meetings and production 
scheduling, based on the conviction that safety is an integral part of 
production systems and accidents are actually symptoms of design faults 
in that system. 
Another expression of management cC1111Jitment found to discrimi~te 
between canpanies was the rank and status of safety officers; hence, in 
the canpanies with better safety records they had a higher status. 'Illis 
finding was reported by the Accident Prevention Advisory Unit in the 
United Kingdom (1976), Cohen et al. (1975), Davis and Stahl (1964), and 
Planek, Driessen, and Vilardo (1967). A second highly consistent 
organizational characteristic discriminating between companies was 
emphasis put on safety training. In canpanies with low accident rates, 
safety training was designed as an integral part of new workers' 
training (Cohen, et al., 1975; National Safety Council, 1969; r-bbley), 
or as a follow-up and periodic retraining for workers and supervisors 
(Davis & Stahl, 1964; Planek et al., 1967). A third characteristic was 
the existence of open CCll1TIUilication links and frequent contacts between 
workers and management (Accident Prevention Advisory United in U.K., 
1976; Cohen et al., 1975). Another expression of this free flow of 
information was found to be the carrying out of frequent safety 
inspections by appropriate personnel (Davis & Stahl, 1964; Planek et 
al., 1967). General environmental control and good housekeeping was the 
fourth characteristic appearing consistently. Orderly plant operations, 
controlled environmental conditions, and high usage of safety devices 
canprised this organizational characteristic in low-accident companies 
(Shafai-Sahrai, 1971; Snith, Cohen, Cohen, & Cleveland, 1975). 
A fifth characteristic was a stable work force with less turnover 
of older workers (Cleveland et al., 1978; Cohen et al., 1975; David & 
Stahl, 1964). Although not specifically studied, this factor probably 
reflected better industrial relations and elaborate personnel 
9 
developnent practices in these factories. 
had distinctive ways of pranoting safety. 
Finally, successful canpanies 
These included guidance and 
counseling, rather than enforcement and admonition. In addition, it 
included individual praise or recognition for safe perfonnance and 
enlisting workers' families in safety pranotions (Cleveland et al., 
1978; David & Stahl, 1964; National Safety Council, 1969). 
When all these organizational characteristics are integrated, it is 
possible to fonn a coherent organizational pattern of a highly safe 
canpany: Management is actively involved in safety management and 
creates a general administrative control climate (Grimaldi, 1970) in 
which work is to be perfonned. Grimaldi reports that climate results in 
increased performance reliability of workers, good housekeeping, and 
high design and maintenance standards for work environments (Grimaldi, 
1970). 'Illere are well-developed personnel-selection training and 
develoµnent programs in which safe conduct is an integral part. 
Ckxmrunication links between workers and management are kept open, 
enabling a flow of information regarding production as well as safety 
matters. Finally, general management philosophy is not strictly 
production oriented but also people oriented, as evidenced by various 
supportive policies described above. All the organizational 
characteristics described above were corroborated in a canprehensive 
10 
review article published by Cohen (1977). 
Based on the review literature, it was decided that Zohar's safety 
climate questionnaire results contained the following dimensions. 'Ihis 
present study was designed to measure the following characteristics: (a) 
perceived management attitudes towards safety, (b) perceived effects of 
safe conduct on promotion, (c) perceived effects of safe conduct on 
social status, (d) perceived organizational status of safety officer, 
(e) perceived importance and effectiveness of safety training, (f) 
perceived risk level at work place, and (g) perceived effectiveness of 
enforcement versus guidance in promoting safety. 'Ihe above perceptions 
are substantiated by Zohar' s study except for dimension (g) which 
included those organizational characteristics found to discriminate 
between high versus low accident rate companies on the basis of 
enforcement measures versus guidance in changing worker behavior. 
PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT FOR BEHAVIOR CHANGE 
TO IMPROVE SAFETY CLIMATE 
~st safety professionals will admit they could benefit from 
education in motivational techniques. Krathwal and Bloom (1964), in 
their taxonany of hunan learning, identified three main domains or 
classifications which are significant for effective safety programs to 
effect change needed for controlling accident potential: 
(a) COGNITIVE - learning objectives which usually require the 
individual to solve an intellectual task by 
identifying the problem and applying previously 
learned solutions. 
(b) PSYCHOr.DTOR - learning objectives which emphasize motor 
skills; these are often found in trade and 
technical levels. 
(c) AFFECTIVE - learning objectives which produce emotional 
feelings and values in the learner about 
selected phenomena (Kr'athwal et al., 1964). 
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Sane safety training programs need to be criticized as barely going 
beyond a skill acquisition/response situations similiar to the Pavlovian 
·model of behavior. In fact, much safety "training" (as distinguished 
from safety "education") is directed at a psychaootor level of learning 
with very little accent given to the awareness properties of cognitive 
domain (Kr'athwal et al., 1964). It is proposed that a greater blending 
of cognitive and psychaootor learning of industrial safety measures 
would lead to a reduction in accidents, especially those caused by 
unsafe acts of workers. \.brkers would be more interested in such an 
approach and they would obtain more satisfaction. 
This researcher theorized that moving from the behavioristic model 
to the cognitive and psychaootor domains, could do much to involve and 
motivate workers internally. Problem solving, creativeness and 
h\.1118nistic influences would prevail. A departure from the Pavlovian 
model, prevelant in industry today, would help implement programs to 
change worker behavior based on internal beliefs, emotions, cues and 
attitudes about the safety environment. 
Management, of course, would not only be exposed to cognitive and 
psychaootor learning of safety education, but also the affect and 
·humanistic domains would be introduced in order to change attitudes 
throughout an organization, starting at the top of the hierarchial 
conmand with changed attitudes emanating through lower levels of the 
hierarchy (Cohen, 1975). 
Humanistic Approaches 
12 
Humanistic education includes a variety of teaching methods and 
approaches such as·counseling employees to improve attitudes, special 
kinds of group exercises, and role playing. The basic objectives of 
humanistic approaches are easy to support. The most important outcome 
of humanistic approaches is a belief that the employee in industry 
should take more responsibility for determining what is to be achieved 
and become more self-directing and independent. Using hunanistic 
methods in industrial training programs would enable employees to become 
self-actualized persons as described by Maslow (1968). The creativity 
of the self-actualized person, inherent in everyone, supposedly requires 
no special talents or abilities. It merely requires the right 
environment for its developnent and support. It shows up when in 
everyday life people are perceptive, spontaneous, expressive, genuine, 
joyful and unafraid. Chly a special kind of freedom can produce such a 
person (Gage, 1975). Rogers and Dymond (1954) presented evidence that a 
certain therapeutic procedure produced a person who came to see himself 
differently -- to accept himself, his feelings, and other persons more 
fully. He became self-directing, confident, mature, realistic about 
his/her goals (Gage and Berliner, 1979, p. 560). 
Certainly, Maslow's prepotency needs can be applied to this study. 
Higher needs of workers cannot emerge until lower ones such as safety 
and job security have first been satisfied. Maslow's theory can be a 
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significant factor in improving and moving the organization safety 
climate to a higher level. Maslow's prepotency theory has been used in 
this study to make canparisons between Israeli worker attitudes and 
attitudes of U.S. workers on the basis of Maslow's needs hierarchy. 
Hawthorne Effect 
'Ille humanistic movement includes industrialists hoping to maximize 
productivity. An experiment at the Western Electric Canpany's plant in 
Chicago almost unintentionally provided significant information on the 
impact of human relations on the productivity in an organization. 
Findings of this study (Roethlisberger and Dickens, 1939) indicated that 
the social aspect of an industrial plant is more important to the 
individual than its productive organization. It also demonstrated that 
satisfying adjustments in the social and emotional realm play a much 
more significant role in industrial production than alterations in wages 
and hours. Q.it of this exhaustive humanistic research came one 
outstanding recommendation -- the establishment of a counseling program 
to assist workers in solving personal problems. Such a program has been 
organized, with one counselor for each 300 employees. One significance 
of this outcane is that it indicates that for the industrial concern 
which desires maximum production, maximum harmony in industrial 
relationships, and maximum develoµnent for the individual worker, 
counseling is a process of the utmost importance (Rogers, 1942). 
The humanistic experiment is credited with changing the 
organizational style of employers to place less emphasis on the rigid 
interpretation of efficiency and greater attention on obtaining the 
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cooperation of employees and helping them identify more closely with the 
organization and its goals. The term "Hawthorne effect" grew out of the 
experiments as well. Those who believe it exists interpret the 
Hawthorne effect as producing a positive change in behavior, learning, 
or output simply through knowledge of participation in an experiment. 
The gain stems from demonstrated concern for the needs of the worker and 
the special attention accorded him during the study (Knezevich, 1975, p. 
78). 
In surmary, the basic assumptions underlying humanistic approaches 
to industrial accident prevention programs lea~ to the following 
implications: 
1. Employees should be allowed to determine their own needs and 
methods to a much greater degree than is customary. 
2. Elnployees need to be encouraged to evaluate themselves in 
relation to efficiency, productivity and safety perhaps more 
than they need evaluations by others, such as supervisors. 
3. O:mnunication, understanding and coping with feelings of others 
is just as important as learning facts, intellectual and 
psychanotor skills. 
4. W:>rking and existing are best done in an abnosphere free of 
threat, pressure, competition, externally imposed standards 
conmon in most industrial settings. 
In an industrial setting these basic assumptions can be applied and 
evaluated by management. Methods for achieving these assunptions will 
require management personnel to allow workers an increased amount of 
freedom in decision making and participative goal setting. Management 
by objectives (MBO) and the Japanese "Quality Circle" systems lend 
themselves to these types of humanistic approaches. 1he·future 
selection of high quality employees by industry will also be an 
important factor in implementing the above basic assunptions. 
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Industrial training programs can foster this kind of training 
atmosphere if the instructor is a genuine, open, and secure human being 
with essentially wann and favorable feeling about other persons in 
general. Such industrial trainers know how to empathize with others, 
that is, to put themselves in another person's place and to understand 
the feelings and needs of employees in training programs. Instructors 
need to work with trainees rather than to consider them as lower class 
citizens. Industrial managers work with and through people to 
accomplish the purposes of the organization. Sensitivity to the hunan 
factor is an important first step. lbw to motivate employees and their 
peers to be safer on the job is an important need. Management must be 
concerned with what makes people behave as they do. 1he search for 
understanding whether it is external motivators or internal motivators 
that drive people to do what they do is a complex one. 1he motivation 
strategies employed will depend in part on how the employer views the 
people with whan he works. In other words (Barnard, 1938), what the 
manager believes to be fundamental hunan nature influences his choice of 
rewards and punishments as well as administrative style. 
In present day industrial settings management philosophy will 
influence administrative style. Industries with democratic (open 
systems) philosophical management will involve employee participation in 
decision making including choices of rewards and punishments. 1he more 
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traditional or autocratic type management system will not be as flexible 
and employees will have more r~strictions in decision making and 
employee participation. The autocratic manager will maintain tight 
control of the safety program. 
Humanists believe that the individual has the capacity to be 
virtually self ~tivated and self-controlled. C.OOperative social 
relations are natural to man, according to the humanistic theory. A 
worker has the propensity to become psychologically involved in 
corporate activity including safety programs. Equally important is the 
concept that a person's reaction to life is influenced most by the way 
he is treated by others. The humanistic executive considers work just 
as natural as play. The worker strives to establish cooperative social 
relations, do not enjoy being loners, are basically self-controlled, and 
naturally creative and strive for excellence in everything they do 
including safety activities. 
Under proper conditions most individuals will seek greater 
responsibilities and use much of their imagination, ingenuity and 
creativity in solving canpany problems. The employer who holds 
these views of his fellow workers will design and organization 
structure and use an administrative style that will place more 
reliance on self-control than on external supervision. Utilizing 
this type of approach in safety will give workers greater freedom to 
act, and will emphasize recognition for achievement to motivate 
rather than fear of punishment of enforcement of strict safety rules 
and regulations (Rogers, 1942). 
Management-by-objectives-and-r~sults (MBO/R) is an approach to 
administration that is concerned with motivation of employees among 
other things. It is a participative management style in which employees 
are motivated by an opportunity to work toward meaningful safety goals 
which workers helped to define (Knezevich, 1975). Employees safety 
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behavior will be affected in industries where participative management 
prevails. M:>tivation to achieve both company and personal safety goals 
will be high. Observations of canpanies utilizing participative 
management indicates that employee teamwork to achieve safety goals 
appears to be more successful in companies using participative "open" 
systems styles of management. Tii.ese same organizations have been able 
to create "peer" pressure by employees which has been highly beneficial 
in achieving a "ZERO" accident rate. 
Maslow (1968) attempted to explain human behavior on the basic 
hierarchy of needs. Tii.e basic physiological needs of hunger and thirst 
usually are placed at the bottan of the hierarchy. Assuming 
physiological cravings are satisfied, motivation of human behavior moves 
up the scale toward safety needs, need for social affection, need for 
self esteem, need to understand, aesthetic needs, and need for 
self-actualization which is highest in the hierarchy. A satisfied need 
no longer motivates. It is difficult to stimulate a person to pursue a 
higher need such as self-actualization if a more basic need such as 
hunger is not satisfied (Maslow, 1968). 
Safety administrators are concerned with human resources which are 
considered assets without which a company could not achieve its 
potential. Recognition of human beings as assets that require further 
development to enhance company growth is a logical outccxne of the 
humanistic approach. Maslow's theory of human behavior on the basis of 
hierarchy can be a significant factor to improving and developing 
corporation safety programs. 
It is theorized that Maslow's hierarchy of needs can be utilized by 
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an industry initially to evaluate individual workers and/or groups of 
workers. Proposed evaluations would be based on the levels workers had 
presumed ·to have reached in Maslow's hierarchy of needs. Although 
safety needs are just one level above the lowest level--physiological 
needs--it is the higher level needs such as self-esteem and self-
actualization that contribute to developing proper safety attitudes. 
Safety theorists have labelled safety climate as an individual 
perception affecting safety attitude. Experience proves ·that worker 
attitudes are instrumental in developing an individual's safety 
behavior. Maslow's theory portends this type of philosophy. 
Safety Training 
All accident-prevention work, whether or not it is educationally 
intended, is nevertheless educational in its effect upon the individual 
employee whan it necessarily involves (Heinrich and Peterson, 1980, p. 
277). 'Ihat this is true is clearly indicated by evidence that the well-
trained and careful workers may avoid injury on dangerous work and that 
untrained and inexperienced workers may be injured even under the 
safest possible conditions. Research by the National Institute on 
Safety and Health (NIOSH) indicates that trained workers in the roofing 
industry have significantly lower accident experience than do untrained 
and/or newly hired workers. 'Ihe roofing industry has one of the highest 
accident frequency rates within the construction industry. In 
construction (roofing) jobs the untrained person could experience a much 
higher level of risk fran an accident standpoint than the trained 
worker. '!his is due to the high exposure rate to many different hazards 
related to the job of roofing. 
Those persons with the responsibility for industrial training 
programs need to understand the basic principles and processes of 
learning and teaching if they are to attain professional competence. 
The proper education of the employee in accident prevention methods and 
procedures is paramount in industry today. M:ist industries invest much 
time and resources in training programs, therefore, a professional 
trainer or instructor must be a master of many skills and fields of 
knowledge including learning concepts. Also, much can be gained by 
applying principles of educational psychology to the development or 
improvement of occupational training programs. 
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What is taught certainly demands technical competence in the areas 
of industrial skills and knowledge, but the way in which the teaching is 
accomplished depends largely on the instructor's understanding of how 
people learn and their ability to apply that understanding. 'Illis part 
of the review of literature can be viewed as a study of applied 
educational psychology, for the subject underlines virtually everything 
with which the trainer or instructor needs to be concerned. 
EDUCATIONAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES 
RELATED TO BEHAVIOR CHANGE 
M:>tivational Techniques 
M:>st safety professionals will admit they could benefit from 
education in motivational techniques. There appear to be four main 
classifications which are significant for improving safety programs and 
in controlling accident potential; namely, cognitive, psychomotor, 
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affective and humanistic concepts. These four danains are included in 
this study. Safety training programs have been criticized for barely 
going beyond stimulus/response concepts similiar to the Pavlovian model 
of behavior. 
'IHE LEARNING PROCESS 
Definition of Learning 
The ability to learn is one of humanity's most outstanding 
characteristics. Learning occurs continuously throughout a person's 
lifetime. To define learning, it is necessary to analyze what 
happens to the individual. Learning theorists generally agree that 
individuals will learn most efficiently if they are motivated toward 
sane goal which is attainable by learning the subject matter 
presented (Heinrich and Peterson, 1980, p. 283). 
As a result of a learning experience, an individual's way of 
perceiving, thinking, feeling, and doing may change. Thus learning can 
be defined as a change in behavior as a result of experience. The 
behavior can be physical and overt, or it can be intellectual or 
attitudinal (Hilgard and Bower, 1975, p. 17), not easily seen. A 
peculiar but nonetheless functional definition of learning is the 
following: 
Learning refers to the change in the subject's behavior to a given 
situation brought about by his repeated experiences in that 
situation, provided that the behavior change cannot be explained on 
the basis of native response tendencies, maturation (Hilgard and 
Bower, 1975), or temporary states of the subject (e.g., fatigue, 
drugs, alcohol, etc.). 
The definition has the import of allowing an inference regarding 
"learning" only when a case cannot be made for another explanation. It 
does not state sufficient conditions for learning, since sane cases of 
repeated experience with a situation do not produce much in the way of 
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observable changes in human behavior. 
Application of Learning to Occupational Safety Training Programs 
In conducting training courses for supervisors in industry, sane 
may ascertain that they may have more important production problems to 
worry about and will spend training time thinking about them and 
canplaining about being taken away f ran the job to learn a lot of 
nonsense. Or they may enjoy the opportunity to get together with the 
"gang" and swap stories. Still others may see the training class as an 
opportunity to show how much they know and to strive for greater 
recognition in the eyes of the trainer and their fellow employees. A 
few may see that new learning may aid them in their job. The behavior 
of people is oriented toward relevant learning goals, whether these 
goals are safety, increased recognition, production, or simply 
socialization. People attempt to achieve those goals which are salient 
at the rnanent, regardless of the trainer's intent (Heinrich and 
Peterson, 1980, p. 286). 
The person training workers has the challenge and responsibility to 
develop learning objectives (goals) which can be fulfilled by everyone 
in a training progrrn. Regardless of the individual differences 
involved, the training director, who has prepared an excellent safety 
training program based on clear-cut learning objectives, can evaluate 
the results based on the achievement of objectives while progressing 
through each training session. 
Learning is a major consideration in safety programs. In order to 
change attitudes, one must substitute new learning for old concepts and 
ideas. To change behavior in need satisfaction sequences, one must 
teach using the best methods possible to achieve the training 
objectives. 
In shop practice, safety education is not specifically defined. 
Ordinarily it refers to meetings and talks, personal contacts with 
authorities or teachers, the use of bulletins and posters or other 
reading matter, sound slides and motion pictures, and first-aid 
instruction. Oral or written instruction in avoiding hazards and 
cultivating safe methods of doing work is also a part of the learning 
processes. 
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In industry, specific safety training among employees is largely a 
task for supervisors and foreman. By virtue of their authority and 
close daily contact, supervisors are in a position to convert safety 
learning concepts to everyday safe practice procedures that apply to 
individual tasks, machines, tools, and process. 
Not only should employees be taught that safety is worthwhile, but 
that it is their duty to themselves, their families, the camrunity, and 
to their employers to avoid injury. 'Illey need to learn about specific 
dangers to be guarded against in their own line of work and what 
specific things they, themselves, may do to avoid injury. M:>st 
employees are uninfonned about the hazards which exist in most jobs and 
as a result, they need to be trained. Safety education is primarily the 
process of imparting knowledge of safe and unsafe mechanical conditions, 
safe and unsafe personal practices, and remedial measures. 
23 
CHARACTERISTICS OF LEARNING 
Individual Differences 
.Each industrial trainee approaches a learning situation from a 
different viewpoint. .Each person is a unique individual whose past 
experience affects readiness to learn and under.standing of the 
requirements involved. For example, an industrial trainer may provide 
two maintenance technicians the assignment of learning certain 
inspection procedures. Che student may thoroughly learn and be able to 
canpetently present the assigned material. Because of job backgromd 
and future goals, that trainee realizes the value of, and the need for, 
learning and procedures. A second worker's goal may be to merely comply 
with the instructor's assignment and, therefore, this person may 
canplete only minimum preparation. The responses differ because each 
person acts in accordance with the requirements seen in a particular 
situation. 
Individual Goals 
~st people have fairly definite ideas about what they want to do 
and achieve. Their goals sanetimes are short term, a matter of days or 
weeks. .Each trainee has specific goals and objectives. These goals may 
be carefully planned for a career or a lifetime. Studies show that 
individuals learn from any activity that tends to further their purposes. 
and that affective and hunanistic education concepts play a role 
(lblmes, 1976). 
CONNECTIONIST LEARNING THEORY 
Stimulus Response Learning 
In occupational training programs the currently important theories 
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of learning can be classified in a number of ways. For our purposes, 
one difference is particula~ly outstanding, the difference between the 
connectionist (psychanotor) and the cognitive theories. C.onnectionist 
interpretations of learning tend to share the assumption that learning 
is a matter of connections between stimuli and responses (Hill, 1977, p. 
26). This is also known as respondent learning where a response is 
elicited by known stimulus. C.onnectionist theorists typically assume 
that all responses are elicited by stimuli (Hi 11, 1977). These 
connections are called by a variety of names, such as habits, 
stimulus-responses bonds, and conditioned responses. Research in this 
area examines responses that occur, the stimuli that elicit them, and 
the ways that experience changes these relationships between stimuli and 
responses. Some of the best examples of respondent learning are the 
classical conditioning experiments performed by Ivan Pavlov. 
C.onnectionist Interpretations to Industrial Training 
M::>st learning theorists agree that learning involves sane type of 
stimulus and a response. An example of stimulus response in driving is 
when a driver enters a skid with a heavy load, the skid is the stimulus 
and the immediate response is to recover. The feeling of safety when 
recovery is canplete is the reward. 
Association 
The factor of association is involved in the example relating to 
the driving experience. The individual associates the skid possibly 
with sane fear. Through the experience of a successful recovery fran 
the skid, the driver has learned by doing. This later aspect, learning 
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by doing and building on past experience, is a phencmenon used often in 
teaching occupational type skills such as driving or operating a crane. 
Trial and Error Learning 
Another type of learning process which is coomonly used in 
occupational training is that of learning by trial and error. Trial and 
error learning is generally considered to be inefficient in that much 
time is often lost attempting to find the correct solution to a problem. 
I:bwever, when direction and guidance are provided in trial and error 
learning, the process can be effective. As an example, the instructor 
might explain driving up a steep incline with a load. The student's 
first attempt would be partially unsuccessful. The student has made a 
trial and an error has resulted because of his lack of coordination 
between the clutch and accelerator. Instead of permitting the trainee 
to continue trying first one method and then another, the instructor can 
intercede and explain to the trainee the source of difficulty. With 
this added information, the student can try again. This process is 
continued with the instructor pointing out the correct and incorrect 
technique until success is finally achieved. 
Habit Formation 
A habit is a learned stimulus-response sequence. When teaching a 
worker to use a piece of industrial machinery (Kaplan, 1964), the 
instructor is attempting to implant new habits. This is one of the 
purposes for having the trainee practice each new skill until its 
execution beccmes autcmatic. Practice strengthens the habits and makes 
the learner less likely to forget (See Appendix X). The instructor should 
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explain the interrelation of new habits to those already learned. This 
occurs through association. 
Psychanotor Learning 
In learning a physical (psychaootor) skill such as driving a 
forklift truck, the learning of a physical skill requires actual 
experiences in performing that skill. Operators of forklift trucks 
learn to drive only if their experiences include driving them. 
Apprentice maintenance technicians learn to overhaul powerplants only by 
actually performing the task. When discussing simple reactions of more 
canplex physical ski Us, we are likely to say, "I guess it's just a bad 
habit I've learned," or with all that practice~" his reactions have 
become fast and smooth." Mental habits are also learned through 
practice. Ek>wever, if trainers see their objective as being only to 
train their student's memory and muscles, they underestimate the 
potential of the total training situation. 
COGNITIVE LEARNING 1HEORY 
Cognitive interpretations are concerned with the cognitions 
(perceptions, attitudes or beliefs) that individuals have about their 
environment, and with the ways these cognitions determine behavior. In 
these interpretations, learning is the study of the ways in which 
cognitions are modified by experience (Hill, 1977, p. 211). When 
discussing matters that involve words or deliberate decisions, we often 
say things like, "He has acquired a lot of knowledge on safe practices," 
or "You'll have to learn that employees don't like to be treated that 
way," or "Now I really understand how to do a job safety analysis!" 
niese interpretations are all cognitive which involve inner feelings. 
Piaget's Theory of Intelligence 
Piaget's theory of intelligence posited equilibration as a 
mechanism of developnent. F.quilibration is a progressive, 
self-regulating process which leads step by step to a final state of 
reversibility that characterizes higher cognitive structures. Cbce a 
person's thought includes the concept of transfo1111ation, he is prepared 
for the next stage in learning. This preparation consists in an 
increased probability that the next stage will soon be reached (Hilgard 
and Bower, 1975, p. 322). 
Concepts of Assimilation and Acca11TJodation 
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'IWo important processes involved in equilibration are assimilation 
and accamlOdation. According to Piaget, assimilation involves knowledge 
derived from the environment and depends on prior experiences producing 
a background into which the new environmental experience fits. 
Assimiliation is the process of "fitting in" new knowledge which then 
becomes part of existing cognitive organization, e.g., interpretation of 
new experiences in te1111s of an existing schema. AccamlOdation, in 
contrast, involves the changing of schemes or structures so as to 
confo1111 to the new experience, e.g., a change in a schema to incorporate 
new experiences. 
Stages of Cognitive Development 
In studying the process of accamlOdation, we can see that a 
person's knowledge structure is constantly changing throughout life. 
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Piaget has described these changes in cognitive develoµnent as follows: 
sensory-motor (birth to 2), preoperational (2 to 7), concrete operations 
(7 to 11) and formal operations (11 to adulthood). 
Piaget also mentions "conservation" which refers to the fact that 
sane quantitative property of matter remains the same in spite of 
changes in other properties. The mastery of various forms of 
conservation takes place at somewhat different ages. 
9?gnitive Interpretations in Industrial Training 
Psychologists sometimes classify learning by types: verbal, 
problem solving, insightful, emotional, perceptual, and conceptual. All 
of these could be concerned with the cognitions that individuals have 
about their environment. These cognitions can be modifed by experience. 
For example, an industrial safety class learning to apply the scientific 
method of problem solving may learn the method by trying to solve real 
problems. But in doing so, it also engages in verbal learning and 
sensory perception at the same time. F.ach student app~oaches the task 
with preconceived ideas and feelings, and for many students these ideas 
change as a result of experience. Previous experience conditions one to 
respond to some things and to ignore others (FAA, Aviation Instructor's 
Handbook AC 60-14, 1977). 
Individuals do not soak up knowledge like a sponge absorbs water. 
The instructor cannot asslUlle that students remember something just 
because they were present in the classroom, shop, or loading dock when 
the instructor "taught" it. Neither can the instructor asslUlle that the 
students can apply what they know because they can quote the correct 
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answer from the book. For learning to occur, individuals must react and 
respond, perhaps outwardly, perhaps only inwardly, emotionally, or 
intellectually. But if learning is a process of changing behavior, 
clearly that process must be an active one and the way in which various 
cognitions (perceptions, attitudes, insights emotions and beliefs) 
deteI11line behavior. Learning, then, is the study of the ways in which 
cognitions are modified by experience. 
Insightful Learning 
Insightful learning is a cognitive process. Insight is a learning 
process by which the person assembles from his present knowledge the 
ideas, concepts and facts which he/she uses to arrive at the answer to a 
new problem or a problem that is similar to problems previously 
experienced. Insight is usually considered to be a relatively sudden 
realization of the correct solution to a problem (Kaplan, 1964). lbw 
the student acquires insight and understanding (ability to make correct 
responses to problems) is the special concern of cognitive theorists of 
the learning process (Gage and Berliner, 1979, p. 272). 
Insightful learning might be compared to the meshing of gears in an 
autanobile transmission. Although controlled automatically in many cars 
today, the gears must mesh before the car may move. The spinning gears, 
which when properly meshed in the transmission cause the car to move, 
could be compared to the human mind. In the mind when the ideas, 
concepts and facts are correlated or aligned in their proper 
perspective, the individual is able to understand new ideas and 
concepts. 
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In a training situation (Kaplan, 1964), the ability of individuals 
to utilize insight varies and this variation must be taken into 
consideration when attempting to teach new ideas to occupational safety 
and health students. O::>gnitive restructuring and insight take place in 
ways that are simply not reducible to the atomistic conceptions of 
behaviorists (Gage and Berliner, 1979). 
SOCIAL LEARNING, IMITATION, M:>DELING 
Imitation Leaming· 
In their first book, Social Leaming and Imitation, Miller and 
Ibllard (1941) state their basic interpretation and then proceed !-o apply 
it to a variety of complex situations. 'llley note that much human 
learning behavior involves imitation. In industrial settings 
individuals solve problems usually doing what they see someone else 
doing. If the xyz C.anpany has achieved a good safety record through a 
behavior modification program, other companies will attempt to imitate 
the basic approach used ty the xyz C.anpany. 
Why companies will imitate another companies successful safety 
program involves some interesting logic. No doubt, time, money and 
manpower will be saved by actually copying, for instance, a behavior 
modification program which has been tested and proven successful by 
another company. Success is measured by a reduced accident frequency 
rate. 
A parallel example can be related here to aircraft research, design 
and testing. Since the beginning of aviation, almost back to the Wright 
Brothers' first flight in 1903, the military has designed and tested all 
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types of aircraft including reciprocating engine aircraft, jet powered 
aircraft, and now rocket propelled space craft. A historical graph will 
show that the military and/or government financed aircraft are a few 
years ahead of civilian design and manufacture. For instance, presently 
we are beginning a transition fran the NASA (government financed) space 
flights to civilian modifications and use. 
According to Miller and IX>llard, the tendency to imitate is itself 
learned. The Miller-IX>llard model of learning implies that when a 
person makes a response (Hill, 1977, p. 238), it is often done in the 
presence of cues produced by the behavior of others. If the response is 
followed by drive reduction, the individual has been rewarded for using 
the cues fran another individual to model his response after the 
other's. When the imitative behavior is rewarded, the individual learns 
to do what he/she sees the other persons do. 
An interesting aspect of the Miller and IX>llard theory is their 
application of imitation principles to social situations. They point 
out that people learn to imitate high-prestige people rather than those 
of low prestige. This principle has clear applications to industrial 
training situations. 
Albert Bandura's work has contributed to the resurgence of interest 
in imitation. Bandura and Richard Walters collaborated on a book 
entitled, Social Learning and Personality Developnent (1963) in which 
they presented their views on imitation as well as on numerous other 
topics. Bandura and Walters have demonstrated that humans can learn by 
imitation in considerably roore canplicated ways than those described 
earlier. An individual can learn by observing saneone else. In fact, a 
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person can arrange simple responses in a canplex sequence purely by 
observing and imitating ~aneone else (Bandura and Walters, 1963. p. 4). 
M:xieling 
A concept even more general than imitation is modeling. M:xieling 
includes not only simple imitation of one person by another, but also 
more pervasive processes (often called identification) by which a person 
attempts to be the sane kind of person as another. A model can be a 
real person or a character in history. In industry and employee's model 
might be his safety supervisor or foreman. 
Interpretations of Social Learning, Imitation and 
M:xieling Industrial Training 
Specific safety training of employees in how to operate a forklift 
truck or sane other type of vehicle is a canmon training responsibility 
in industry. Consider how difficult it would be to learn to operate a 
vehicle if every step of the process had to be shaped by Skinnerian 
procedures. Reinforcing the learner for each correct use of the 
controls would be inefficient and slow. In this type of skill learning 
situation it is important to master proper steering and braking 
techniques initially. 'lllrough observation and imitation of an 
experienced driver the learner can increase both the speed of learning 
and the chance of surviving the training course. The learner in this 
situation can learn much by observation of the skill performed by a 
professional. In addition. infol1Tlation can be acquired by listening. 
The canbination of listening, watching and then having the learner 
perfoI111 the driving risk will result in rapid learning of the driving 
skill under guidance of a professional driver. 
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C.Onsidering all the skills and social behaviors individuals acquire 
fran one another, such acquisition· of new responses is certainly an 
important kind of imitation •. Imitation and roodeling can be used 
effectively in industrial training situations by trainers who understand 
these processes. 
In addition to imitation, Bandura and Walters (1963) discussed the 
processes of inhibition or disinhibition of already learned responses. 
If, for example, an employee (learner) has already learned to make a 
response, but learns by observing a professional driver whether or not 
to make a response; for instance, in a braking situation the response 
could be locking brakes in certain emergencies instead of snubbing the 
brakes. This is called inhibition. The learner learns by observing the 
professional driver not to make the incorrect response and why. 
Disinhibition refers to the case where a learner has already both 
learned how to make the response and learned not to make it in a given 
situation, but now observes the professional driver makes the response 
and proceeds to do so also. Here the inhibited response has been 
disinhibited through a process of imitation (Bandura and Walters, 1963). 
Imitative behavior is often rewarded by the model (Elnployer) and. 
in addition, brings rewarding consequences (employee incentive 
programs), provided the roodel exhibits socially effective behavior (good 
safety example by employer); consequently, most employees in industry 
develop a generalized practice of following the examples of their 
superiors. According to Bandura and Walters, social behavior patterns 
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are most rapidly acquired through the combined influence of models and 
differential reinforcement. Industries have had success in changing 
employee attitudes toward safety by dispensing reinforcers according to 
some plan and schedule. 
APPLIED BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS IN OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY 
Under the more familiar title of Behavior M:xiification, we have 
suggested several connectionist, cognitive and imitative approaches to 
managing safety in some detail. It should be noted~ in this paper. that 
safety professionals are aware of the concepts developed by B.F. 
Skinner, but they are not aware of learning concepts such as other 
connectionist theories, cognitive learning approaches, social learning, 
imitation and modeling presented earlier in this paper. The Skinnerian 
approach to managing safety has been used by a few industries. The 
application of applied behavioral analysis in occupational safety has 
not yet appeared in the literature, but a general support has been 
emphasized (Berger, 1968; Bird and Schlesinger. 1970; M:Intire and 
White, 1975; Peterson, 1975). 
Skinner (1953) and others have suggested that the technique of 
applied behavioral analysis may be effectively used by industry in 
handling problems with quality control (Petersen and Goodale, 1980, p. 
236), employee training, motivation, and discipline. The behaviorial 
approach departs from the traditional conception of applied psychology 
by rejecting the concepts of needs, impulses, desires, and drives. 
Instead, emphasis is placed upon the external environmental. 
situational, and social stimuli that influence behavior ( Kazdin. 1975). 
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To behaviorists like Skinner (Brown, 1980), the isolation and 
manipulation of these stimuli are of paramount concern. Interest in 
establishing behaviorial programs in industry has grown within the past 
few years; however, the bulk of the research remains within the 
educational and therapeutic realms. 
Behavioral Change 
Behavioral change is necessary in any organization in which hazards 
are present, simply because it is a critical factor in the alleviation 
of accident potential (Aitken, 1973). Approximately 90 percent of all 
accidents are caused by unsafe acts by workers, and the remaining 10 
percent are caused by unsafe conditions. 1herefore, behavioral change 
is a factor necessary for accident reduction. 1he major concern is not 
whether behavior should be changed, but who will change it, what will be 
changed, and how will it be accomplished. Questions need to be answered 
by each individual organization. In the event they do not have 
personnel qualified to develop programs designed to bring about 
behavioral change in workers, possibly outside consultants need to be 
considered. 1here is a growing number of industrial psychologists who 
have developed successful safety programs based on behavioral concepts. 
Changing Worker Behavior 
1he safety professional must be aware that if his workers are going 
to learn safety procedures they must be so motivated. To merely point 
out that accidents cost the company money will not motivate them. To 
change behavior, the safety professional must emphasize the hazards 
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which are risked when using unsafe work procedures: the probability of 
serious and painful injury and the possible loss of earning power. The 
cost, not only in dollars but also psychologically to both the worker 
and his family, should motivate the worker to learn safe work methods. 
It is imperative that employees know why they need to learn the 
right way and/or safe way to perform job tasks. They can be shown ''what 
to do" and ''how to do it", but until they understand ''why" they need to 
use a certain safe procedure, the entire effort could be fruitless. 
Affective Approaches 
Safety people must appeal to fundamental human desires to be 
effective. Even if employees believe what they are told,, for example, 
"Snaking will hurt your wind," there is no guarantee that they will 
change their behaviors. Persuasion in particular demands appeal to 
emotion. People act largely because of the way they feel. To persuade 
others, it is necessary to understand the motives which lead people to 
act as they do. Other motives that can be appealed- to in the affective 
danain are the desire for security, social approval, ideals, ambition 
and interest in maintaining life and health, desire for wealth, love of 
hane and family, etc. 
SUllllary 
While the concept of organizational safety climate is new, 
organizational climate theory is not. A brief surrmary of the history 
shows that studies in the 1930's suggested a link between perceived 
climate, the production employee and actual climate (Lewin, 1938). A 
sum1arization of a number of studies reviewed emphasized the importance 
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of employee perceptions in decisions which concern the appropriateness 
of individual planned behavior (Lewin, 1938; Litwin and Stringer, 1968). 
The review of the literature indicated that the perceptions employees 
share about their specific work environment make up the occupational 
climate. The only other study of occupational safety climate, based on 
employee perceptions, was conducted by researcher Ibv Zohar in Israel 
during 1980. Zohar administered an organizational safety climate 
questionnaire to workers in Israel. His questionnaire was administered 
to production workers in a stratified sample of 20 Israeli industrial 
organizations in 1980. Zohar found, in his study, that the chemical, 
metal, textile and food production workers, making up Zohar's sample, 
had carmon organizational climate perceptions. Safety performance 
measures such as severity rates could not be used to validate the safety 
perceptions of workers due to weaknesses in Israel's workers' 
compensation statistics. An alternative effort at validation was used 
by Zohar which was the correlation of safety climate scores with safety 
program effectiveness. Independent safety inspectors were utilized. 
This method was considered weak because of insufficient familiarity with 
the organizations evaluated by Zohar and his group of researchers. 
In general, this review of literature has outlined ways in which 
organizational safety climate is dependent on a variety of educational 
and psychological factors. These factors include: 
1. cognitive-developnental factors which should be a concern of 
management, and which need to be introduced, along with 
affective and hunanistic danains, in order to change attitudes 
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of workers throughout an organization; 
2. social factors, which are of concern for operant and social 
learning (imitation and modeling) approaches to safety climate 
and social behavior based on perceived effects of safe conduct 
on promotions and the social status of workers; 
3. conceptualized needs of workers which may be interpreted 
according to Maslow's ''hierarchy of needs" theory; 
4. application of modern principles of educational psychology to 
the development and/or improvement of occupational safety 
training programs; and 
5. hunanistic factors including employee ratings of perceived 
risks and the effectiveness of guidance versus enforcement in 
promoting safety. 
CHAPTER III 
ME'IHOD 
!_lypotheses 
Listed are the two hypotheses which were tested: 
1. There is no significant difference between "safe" and "unsafe" 
workers. 
a. As indicated by the item scale scores. 
b. As defined by all 50 items of the instrunent. (Zohar/Holmes 
Safety Climate Attitude Inventory Appendix III). 
2. There is no similarity between factor structures of factor 
loadings in American industries versus those in Israel. 
Sample 
Eleven industrial organizations were selected for questionnaire 
administration. Orgar.ization selection was accomplished from a list of 
organizations utilized by the lhiversity of Wisconsin-Whitewater in its 
intern program. The selection process involved the somewhat abitrary 
selection of industries with different working conditions (See Appendix 
VII). It was important for the study to have both high risk and low 
risk industrial working conditions included. The typical conditions 
were classified into high and low incidence rates. Incidence rate·s are 
based on the rate of accidents/illnesses per 100 employees (See 
definitions sections Appendix VIII). The organizations selected were 
accessible to the University of Wisconsin in a dual state area; namely, 
Illinois and Wisconsin. 
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1he study sample consisted of 425 workers fran nine industrial type 
organizations and two ~ity employee groups. 1he total sampling was 
divided into two separate groups of employees (Group I & Group II). 
Group I consisted of 208 workers who had not experienced any accidents 
within the past five year period. Group II included 217 employees who 
had experienced at least 1 or more work related accidents within the 
past 5 year period. (see Table I). 
Procedure 
A pilot study was conducted at 1he Weiler Canpany in Whitewater, 
Wisconsin during August 1984. A three phase procedure was tested for 
the purpose of determining the feasibility of conducting The Safety 
Climate Study. Phase.!. consist~ of the selection of a key contact 
person within the canpany. (1he Superintendent of Manufacturing was 
chosen to coordinate the study internally within Weiler). Phase II 
involved the randan selection of 20 workers fran two groups of 
employees. Group I included employees who had not suffered a work 
related accident within the past five year period; whereas. Group II was 
made up of workers who had experienced at least one work--related 
accident in the past 5 years. Phase III consisted of the random 
distribution of the attitudinal safety climate inventory to the two 
groups of employees. 1he inventory plus a set of instructions were 
distributed in a self-addressed envelope for mailing to the Department 
of Safety Studies, University of Wisconsin-Whitewater. Each envelope 
was coded for specific employee recognition and canpany identification. 
1his information was needed for data analysis purposes only. 
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'Ille Weiler Canpany employs approximately 100 persons in various 
jobs related to the fabrication of camierical meat grinders and mixers. 
As a result of the success of the three-phase procedure. and the 
excellent internal company coordination of the study at the Weiler 
Canpany, it was decided to expand the study to include eleven industrial 
organizations, including Weiler. Table I includes a list of the eleven 
organizations. 'Ille number of employees varied from 100 to 5.500 workers 
in the eleven industrial organizations. 
INS'IRUMENTATION 
Based on the review of safety literature and reconmended research 
procedures, seven organizational dimensions were included in the safety 
climate attitude inventory. 'Ille first 40 inventory items were similar 
to those used by Dr. :DJv 7.ohar in his 1980 safety climate study 
conducted in Israel. 'lllis researcher developed 15 additional items 
needed for added validity and scale reliability in two of the 
dimensions; namely, perceived effectiveness of enforcement versus 
guidance in promoting safety, and the perceived effects of safe conduct 
on social status. - 'Ille additional items on enforcement versus guidance 
sought the employee's perceptions relative to supervisor guidance being 
more important than enforcement of safety rules. Other items were 
designed for comparing counseling by supervisors as being more effective 
than punishment or reprimand. 
As for the additional items on perceived effects of safe conduct or 
social status, the items were designed to rate the importance of safe 
conduct on improving social status among employees. 'Ille "safe" and 
''unsafe" groups were asked to record their perceptions on a 
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unidimensional 6 point Likert Scale ranging from high disagreement to 
high agreement with the added statements dealing with social status as 
well as guidance versus enforcement 
Chee the safety attitude inventory was finalized it was mailed to 
five safety directors and/or managers for review purposes. A letter 
accompanied the inventory requesting the company's cooperation in 
administering the inventory as a method of measuring the safety climate 
in their organization. Furthermore, the letter stated that the project 
was aimed at measuring what employees presuppose about organizational 
safety so that management may better pinpoint health and safety 
problems. The safety directors were requested to review the inventory 
items to determine their feasibility and readability. Also they were 
asked to react to the sample "directions to workers" and to make changes 
and/or deletions on the inventory form (See Appendix II). 
The performance data were collected following the completed 
revision and preparation of the inventory. Each company was provided a 
total of 80 inventories which were distributed to the "safe" and 
"unsafe" groups on a randan bases by the key contact person who, in most 
cases, was the company safety director or manager The Three step plan 
used at the Weiler Canpany was followed in conducting the study in the 
10 additional industries Below is a list of industrial organizations 
and the number of returns from the "accident" and "no accident" groups 
Each employee, randomly selected was provided a packet containing 
(1) the 50 item inventory. (2) letter of introduction and statement of 
confidentiality and (3) a self-addressed and stamped envelope to be 
returned to the Safety Studies Department. University of 
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Wisconsin-Whitewater. Each self-addressed envelope was coded for 
specific employee identifjcation. e.g., "(A) accident" group versus 
"(NA) non-accident" group in addition to a canpany indentification code .. 
TABLE I 
PERFORMANCE SITES AND INVENTORY RESPONSES 
Safety Organization 
Schneider Transportation 
Safety-Kleen C.Orporation 
Ambrosia Chocolate C.O. 
City of Kenosha 
Signode C.Orporation 
American Brass-
Arco Metals 
The Larsen Cio. ( 1 ) 
The Larsen C.O. (2) 
Mercury Marine 
Milwaukee Metropolitan 
Sewerage District 
Weiler C.Orporation 
(pilot study 40 questionnaires) 
Group I 
No Accident 
27 
18 
25 
1l 
30 
19 
15 
31 
17 
2 
13 
Group II 
Accident 
23 
16 
23 
50 
21 
14 
23 
21 
18 
0 
10 
These data were used for analysis purposes only, with 
Return 
% 
62.5 
42.5 
60 0 
76.2 
63.7 
41.2 
47.5 
65.0 
43.7 
00.025 
57.5 
confidentiality maintained. The inventory data collection period was 
f ran Ck tober 1 , 1984 through November 15 , 1984 ~ 
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After the data collection period, a three-week pre-data 
computation-period similar to a baseline period was determined. This 
allowed the researcher to follow-up with company personnel directly. In 
sane cases, where canpanies were delayed in distributing the inventories 
to workers, follow-up phone calls and reminder letters were mailed to 
safety contacts. 
DESIGN AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
Initially, the data collected fran Zohar's 40 item questionnaire 
were factor analyzed with SPSSX using principal canponent factor 
analysis with varimax Rotation. Table III displays the 8 factors 
obtained. The results of the .American study differ significantly fran 
Dr. Ihv Zohar' s Israeli study (See Table VI). 
Table VI shows the results of canparing Zohar's original 40 
questions with the .American (l.Dyola) sample. Tables IV and V specify. 
the item numbers loading on each factor. 'IWo major differences between 
Zohar's study and the Loyola study can be noted in Table VI. First 
there is a significant difference in the order of the factor 
descriptions based on the principal-canponent factor analysis and the 
item loadings on factors (Loyola Study) were sanewhat different than the 
Israeli item loadings. In view of these differences especially in the 
order of factors, the null hypothesis is not rejected. 
The quartimax procedure initially resulted in fourteen factors. 
Several factors were canbined to confirm the validity of the logic 
method used. Those items which logically clustered together, factors 
were canbined to form factorially canplex scales. This is explained in 
Table VIII. 
'Ille Factor Transf onnation matrix ccrnposed of 14 Factors is 
contained in Table X. 'Ille initial factor analysis using principal 
ccrnponent factoring with iteration subsequent to the orthogonal 
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Q..iartimax Rotation resulted in 14 factors. Table VIII illustrates all 
14 factors and their respective factor loadings. Factors 8. 9. 10. 11. 
12, 13 and 14 have been ccxnbined with conmon factors 1 through 7. 
First, logic was used, followed by analytical methc:xis (factor 
analysis); and then a return to logic. Scale ccxnplexity is displayed in 
Table VIII. 
For example, factors 8 and 13, both having eigenvalues of 1.37 and 
1.08 respectively, were retained to conform the validity of factors 6 
and 7. Table XI lists these factors and their respective eigenvalues. 
An eigenvalue of 1.00 is the lowest recarmended for factor retention 
(Guttman, 1954). 'Illis was done because in discriminant analysis used 
in this study, it proved to be a high discriminant value. 
'Ille dimensions (factors) include those organizational 
' 
characteristics which were found to discriminate between high versus low 
accident-rate ccxnpanies. 
'Ille procedure used, included steps to create norms following the 
develoµnent of scale scores. Scales scores were created on each of the 
seven factors. A minimum of four items was used for scale reliability 
of the loadings on each factor. A minimum item loading of .30 was 
utilized, Chee the scale scores were determined. in a linear 
ccxnbination, (addition was then used to obtain a scale score). 'Ille 
Likert Scale items in the test instrument had dimensions of 1 through 5. 
46 
A total attitude score was detemined by this procedure and the average 
sum for all scores was then calculated. A multivariate analysis of 
variance was conducted which indicated significance in four of the seven 
factors. 
Cronbach's Coefficient Alpha was used to calculate estimates of 
reliability for each of the seven scales as well as for the total 
instrument (See Table XXXIV). Cronbach's Alpha Coefficient of .8599 
indicated a strong positive reliability of safety climate (See Table 
XXXVI). 
Differences between scale scores were determined using discriminant 
analysis of all 50 items. The two important variables of the study, the 
"safe" versus "unsafe" groups were analyzed utilizing discriminant 
analysis. The Spearman-Brown Split-half reliability on items (1-50) 
resulted in a reliability coefficient for part 1 (.7831) & for part 2 
(. 7256). 
When examl.ning the factor structure it is apparent that some items 
have complexity. Since the factor analysis of this instrument indicates 
a substantive departure from Zohar's study, the factor structure was 
re-examined to create scale values. It should be noted here that the 14 
factors yielded sub-scales in cases where the factors contained too few 
items to be considered reliable. The combining of factors lead to 
factorially complex scales. These factorially complex sub-scales then, 
yielded reasonable estimates of reliability. Appendix VI relates the 
manner in which these factors Linearly combined to form sub-scales. 
Those items having the highest complexity are also displayed in 
Appendix VI. 
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Sunmary 
In this chapter the following problems were addressed: 
1. Hypothesis one deals with the differences between "safe" and 
"unsafe" workers. Part A was indicated by the item scale scores. Part 
B was analyzed, as defined by all 50 items of the test instrument using 
discriminant analysis. Hypothesis two deals with the similarities of 
factor structures in .American industries versus those in Israel. 
2. The description of the sample was presented. The total sample 
consists of 427 workers fran eleven industrial organizations. The total 
sampling is divided into two groups; Group I consists of 208 workers who 
had not experienced an accident within the past 5 years and Group II 
includes 219 workers who had experienced one or more accidents within 
the past 5 year period. 
3. Procedures along with the instrumentation. design and 
statistical procedures include factor analysis, discriminant analysis. 
scale scores. multivariate and univariate analysis of variance and 
Cronbach's Coefficient Alpha, and the Spearman-Brown split-half 
reliability coefficient. These measures were used to make canparisons 
of safety climate scores between canpanies analyzed in this study. Also 
content analysis and logical methods were used to determine safety 
climates in the industrial organizations included in this present study. 
Greater detail of the analyses will be provided in Chapter IV. 
TABLE II 
ZOHAR'S ISRAELI SIDDY TABLE 
Principal C.anponents Factor Analysis-Safety 
Factor 
perceived importance of 
safety training 
program 
perceived management 
attitudes toward 
safety ' 
perceived safe conduct 
on pranotion 
perceived level of risk 
at wo.rkplace 
perceived effects of 
required work pace 
on safety 
perceived status of 
safety officer 
perceived effects of 
safe conduct on 
social status 
perceived status of 
safety conmittee 
Climate Questionnaire 
Z.Ohar' s Original 40 Items 
Eigenvalue % of variance 
9.84 40.9 
4.63 19.3 
2.53 10.6 
2.34 9.7 
1.66 6.9 
1.17 4.8 
1.07 4.4 
.84 3.4 
No. 0 
Question-
naire Item 
6 
9 
7 
5 
3 
5 
2 
3 
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TABLE III 
lDyola (American) Study 
Principal-Canponents Factor Analysis of 
'Ihe Safety Climate Questionnaire 
Z.Ohar's Original 40 Questionnaire Items 
Factor 
perceived management 
attitudes toward 
safety 
perceived status of 
safety officer 
perceived effects of 
safe conduct on 
social status 
perceived eeffects 
on safety conduct 
on pranotion 
perceived level of 
risk at workplace 
perceived effects of 
required work pace 
status safety 
perceived importance of 
safety training 
perceived status of 
safety conmittee 
Eigenvalue % of variance 
7.74 19.4 
2.92 7.3 
2.11 5.3 
1. 72 4.3 
1.49 3.7 
1.42 3 .6 
1.26 3.2 
1.20 3.0 
No 0 
question-
naire items 
9 
5 
3 
6 
5 
3 
5 
3 
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TABLE IV 
Loyola (1985) Safety Climate Study 
40 Item Safety Climate ~estionnaire 
Factor Description 
perceived management attitudes 
toward safety 
perceived status of safety 
officer 
perceived effects of safe 
conduct on social status 
perceived effects of safe 
conduct on pranotion 
perceived level of risk 
at workplace 
perceived effect of required 
work pace on safety 
perceived importance of 
safety training programs 
perceived status of safety 
· carmittee 
Item Number 
5, 6, 11, 14, 18, 21, 
14, 27' 36 
10, 23, 31, 38, 40 
. 
8, 12, 28 
4, 20, 30, 32, 33, 35 
3, 15, 22, 26, 34 
2, 13, 20 
7, 12, 25, 29, 39 
1, 17, 19 
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TABLE V 
Zohar's (1980) Israeli Safety Climate Study 
Safety Climate Questionnaire 
40 Item Safety Climate Questionnaire 
Factor Description 
perceived importance of 
safety training programs 
. 
perceived management 
attitude toward safety 
perceived effects of safe 
conduct on pranotion 
perceived level of risk 
at workplace 
perceived effects of required 
work pace on safety 
perceived status of safety 
officer 
perceived effects of s?fe 
conduct on social status 
perceived status of safety 
camiittee 
Item Nunber 
7, 12, 25, 29, 33, 39 
5, 6, 11, 14, 18, 21 
24, 27, 36 
4, 13, 20, 28, 30, 32, 35 
3, 15, 22, 26, 34 
9, 16, 37 
10, 23, 31, 38, 40 
2, 8 
1, 17, 19 
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TABLE VI 
Comparison of Safety Climate 
Questionnaire Factors & Item Loadings in American Study Versus Zohar' s Israelie Results 
Factor& Factors Zohar's American Eigenvalues 
Factor Description Zohar American Item No.' s Item No's Zohar American Comments 
Perceived importance of 7 7,12,25,29,33, 7, 12,25,29, 9.84 l.26 
safety training programs 39 33,39 
Perceived management 2 5,6,11;14,18, 5,6, ll, 14, 18, 4.63 7.74 
attitudes towards safety 21,24,27,36, 21,24,27,36, 
Perceived effects of safe 3 4 3,13,20,28,30 4,13,20,28,30, 2.53 1. 72 
conduct on promotion 32,35 32,35 
Perceived level of risk 4 5 3,15,22,26,34 3,15,22,26,34 2.34 1.49 
at workplace 
Perceived effects of 5 6 9,16,37 9,16,37 1.66 1.42 Combined 
required wrk pace on factors 
safety F-6 & Fll 
Perceived status of 6 2 10,23,31,38,40 10,23,31,38,40 1.17 2.92 
safety officer 
Perceived effects of 3 2,8, 8, 12,28 1.07 2.11 
safe conduct on social 
status 
Perceived status of 8 8 1,17,19 1,17,19 .84 1.20 
safety cOlllllittee 
S3 
TABLE VII 
FACTOR LOADINGS 
F1 F2 F3 F4 FS F6 F7 
Is .31 I4 .61 I3 .62 1s .40 I1 .68 I.42 . 70 I2 .37 
I6 . 70 lz9 .32 19 .7S I12 . .43 I10 .S1 I.44 .39 I13 .67 
I7 .3S I30 • 7S I1S .-74 lzs .69 I17 .S8 I.47 .41 I19 .6S 
I11 • 70 I33 .68 I16 .36 I31 .so lz3 .49 r.48 .S6 I20 .60 
114 .77 I3S .3S 122 .49 I32 .so I40 .42 I.49 .60 I41 .S9 
I18 • 7S I39 .3S 126 .68 I38 .42 I. so .S1 I4s .6S 
121 .64 I34 .66 I46.68 
lz4 .6S 137 .62 
lzs .49 
121 • 7S 
I36 . 79 
143 .S9 
SCALE COMPLEXITY 
SCALE ITEM ITEM ITEM 
SCALE LABELS COMPOSITION LOADING & COMPOSITION IDENTIFIERS 
1 Management Fl + F9 For Fl 
Attitude I5 .75533 Supervisor Informed 
16 • 70110 General Manager Informed 
I7 .35696 Training Worthy Investment 
Iu .70941 Management Willing to Invest $ 
I14 .77612 Management Informed Safety 
I18 .75533 Managers Care Risk Levels 
121 .64054 Manager View Safety Reg's Seriously 
124 • 65404 Safety Issues High Priority 
I25 .49033 Training Investment ($) Pays 
127 .75927 Manager Controls Hazards 
136 .79017 Management Adopts .New Ideas 
For F9 
143 • 59271 Important For Supervisor-Point Out llaza:rds 
For F2 
2 Safe F2 + F6 + F7 !4 .61479 Safe Worker Promoted 
Conduct/ I29 • 32352 Trained Worker Safer . 
Promotion 130 • 75671 Safety Affects Evaluation 
133 .68164 Trained Worker Promoted 
I35 .35461 Accident Affects Reputation 
I39 .40158 Trained Worker Better Job 
For F6 
I35 .47576 Accident Affects Reputation 
For F1 
14 • 33471 Safe Worker Promoted 
\JI 
~ 
SCALE COMPLEXITY (cont.) 
SCALE ITEM ITEM ITEM 
SCALE LABELS COMPOS IT ION LOADING & COMPOSITION IDENTIFIERS 
3 RISK F3 + F9 + F12 + F13 For F.J 
LEVEL !3 .622S3 Risk Level Concern 
I15 .74313 Chance of Accident Large 
Il6 .36697 Premium System No Time For Safety 
122 .49773 Matter of Time Before Accident 
126 .6S629 Job Safety Problems Serious 
For F!.J .• 
I37 • 3016S Workers Not On Premium System Safer 
For F12 
I9 .75955 Safe & Unsafe Workers 
For F14 
l34 This Factory Dangerous 
4 Safety F4 + Fl For F4 
Training Is .40S25 Best Guys Care About Safety 
I12 .436S7 Safety Training Helps Job/Home 
I2S .69403 Those Who Work S~f ely Emphasize it 
I32 .5016S Managers Recall Accident/Involver 
I3s .42241 Dangerous Situation Reported 
For Fl 
rs .34755 Best Guys care About Safety 
112 .44614 Safety Training Helps Job/Home 
SCALE COMPLEXITY (cont.) 
SCALE ITEM ITEM ITEM 
SCALE LABELS COMPOSITION LOADING & CCMPOSITION IDENTIFIERS 
5 STATUS-· Fs +Fi + F2 + for Fs· OF 
SAFETY Fa+ F13 I1 .68638 Safety Committee Warning Affects 
OFFICER I Behavior 
Ito .51915 Safety Officer Influence Great 
I17 .58510 Safety Committee Positive Effect 
I23 .49289 Safety Officer Opinion Affects 
Evaluation 
For Fl 
110 .50856 Safety Officer Influence Great 
!17 .49227 Safety Committee Positive Effect 
140 .42670 Safety Officer Regulation Considered 
For F2 
I23 .37005 Safety Officer Opinion Affects 
Evaluation 
For Fa 
131 • 50641 Workers Using PPE not Cowards 
For Fi 3 
I31 .36339 Workers Using PPE not Cowards 
6 Enforce- :F6 +Fl + F13 For F6 
ment v/s !47 .41254 Atmosphere Free of Threat Etc. Guidance 148 .56843 Supervisor's Understanding 
I49 .60483 Supervisor's Humanistic 
rso -.51318 Supervisor Make Me Feel Lower Class 
I.Tl 
°' 
SCALE COMJ?LEXITY (cont.) 
SCALE ITEM ITEM ITEM 
SCALE LABELS COMPOSITION LOADING & COMPOSITION IDENTIFIERS 
For F1 
I48 .52490 Supervisor's Understanding 
I49 .50701 Supervisor's HlDllanistic 
I47 ..• 33321 Atmosphere Free of Threat Etc. 
. For F13 
142 .70309 Supervisor Guidance Over Enforcement 
I44 .39855 Corrective Counseling More 
Effective Than Punishment 
7 Social F2 + F6 + Fa+ For F7 
Status 
·Flo+ Fu I2 .37053 Worker's Violations Aggravate Others 
113 .67733 Reckless Behavior Negative 
20 Evaluation 
r20 .60337 Worker's Violation Adverse Effect 
For F6 
Evaluation 
I2 .33545 Worker Violation's Aggravate Others 
For Fa 
I2 .40034 Worker's Violations Aggravate Others 
·
141 .69090 Worker's Conduct Improves Social 
For F10 
I45 .65160 Employee's Self Evaluation 
I46 .68637 Coping With Feelings of Others 
For Fu 
119 .65215 Status Belonging to Safety Committee 
Vt 
....... 
ss· 
TABLE IX 
IDENTIFICATION OF SCALE COMPELXITY 
THOSE ITEMS WITH THE HIGHEST COMPLEXITY: 
F1 ITEM 2 ... 3 FACTOR LOADINGS 
F6, F1, Fg 
Fz ITEM 4 = 2 FACTOR LOADINGS 
F2, F1 
ITEM 35 = 2 FACTOR LOADINGS 
F2' F6 
F4 ITEM 8 .. 2 FACTOR LOADINGS 
F4' Fl 
ITEM 12 = 2 FACTOR LOADINGS 
F4, Fi 
l?5 ITEM 10 .. 2 FACTOR LOADINGS 
Fs, Fi 
ITEM 17 i= 2 FACTOR LOADINGS 
F5, Fl 
ITEM 23 = 2 FACTOR I.DADINGS 
Fs, Fz 
F6 ITEM 47 = 2 FACTOR LOADINGS 
F6, F2 
l.TEM 48 = 2 FACTOR LOADINGS 
F6' ·F1 
ITEM 49. = 2 FACTOR LOADINGS 
F6, Fi 
TABLE X 
FACTOR TRANSFORMATION MATRIX 
PlCTOR TRlNSl'ORlllTION lllTRIX: 
l'lCTOR FACTOR 2 FlCTOR 3 FlCTOR 4 FACTOR 5 FACTOR 6 FlCTOR 7 FACTOR_ 8 
flCTOR I .11 ·1 .Jb I • ~ll'JI -.07304 .25576 .17438 • "15094 • o8ai 1 • 168'45 llCTOR 2 -.24125 .44'109 ,118437 • 19 119 - .30421 -.2779.I • l.30117 ; l 5f>98 
.PlCTOli 3 ,08698 -.679'40 • 114462 • 16097 • 11510 -. 08'1 76 .008411 ..()3.346 FlCTOR 4 .231152 -.099711 
·i8082 -.31474 •40568 -. 044.34 -.21575 - •. 3.3635 FlCTOB 5 -.02796 -,060 19 • 3876 • I 1133 -.32351 • 66644 
-. on at -· 2226<J flCTOR 6 -. 023 o::i -.05720 
- -p876 -.00632 -• 087 '10 • 030 ~ 9 - .6296 -, I 4605 PlCTOR 7 .22944 • 126:.!6 • 510:.! -.62024 -.II 1011 -.036 2 • 18889 
- • 211111 
.PlCTOB 8 -.10128 - • 255.J5 -.08506 - , 02 I I 0 • 44171 • 40561 ,38522 
-. 2113117 llCTOR 9 .09159 -.19323 - • .332 lt3 -. 19839 - .051t05 -.23512 .31t236 .10Jl0 llCTOli 10 • 11792 ,08624 .26320 • 23249 -.16077 
-.13298 -.07185 
-. 438:.!3 l'lC?OR 11 • 16387 - • 32868 ,04545 , 12307 -. 17 l.66 -,411173 
- .0694tl ._23825. llCTOR 12 -. 003 95 • 15209 • 15<J95 -.29886 -• 35.425 • 00377 -.39134 • 2720 2 
.P lCTOli 13 • 050 33 - • I II 59 .11435 -.18586 -.14157 -.02867 ::~n% • 293311 FlCTOR 14 .01164 • 05532 - .016811 ,3784!3 :-.14093 -. 10479 ~.112821 
FACTOR 9 FACTOR 10 FACTOR II f'lCTOR 12 FACTOR 13 FACTOR I 4 
FlCTOR I • 10092 • 06013 ,07390 -,03440 .02621 ,"00445 
llCTOR 2 ,J l 085 • 15871 -.O~l 85 • 18113 '220.111 • 11982 llCTOB 3 .12112 • 1827 6 .2 860 -.25269 -.09150 • 2 'J590 i'lCTOB 4 .05483 -.49591 -.24404 ,31171 -.14753 • 05910 
FlCTOR 5 -.11540 - • 02761 -.271130 • 30090 • 17241 .22770 
flCfOR 6 .46086 • 2976 7 -.11348 -,00096 • 39055 • 16023 
flCTOR 7 • I 0925 .22295 • 262 26 • 0284 7 .25912 • 032911 
llCTOR 8 -.01457 • 281 :.13 -.02759 • 11754 .24659 -.41688 
FlCTOR 9 -.15470 .28266 - • 114857 ,21966 -.04092 • 51361 
l'lCTOR 10 -.25533 .21148 
-. 55690 -,41880 • 0 1158 -.13787 
.P ACTOR II -.1869.3 - • 13699 -.05913 ,30815 
.51179 -. 381122 FlCTOR 12 -.59177 • 369911 • 1111114 -,OH89 
- • 0771 -.02816 
FlCTOR 1J .37090 • 3308 3 - .2653() • 16158 -.52048 -,45547 
FlCTOR 14 -. 16025 • 28319 .29197 ,59539 .,-,27534 • 0 5918 
VARIABLE COMMUNALITY 
ITEM 1 .56227 
ITEM 2 .59227 
ITEM 3 .57415 
ITEM 4 • 64 735 
ITEM 5 .59565 
ITEM 6 .54273 
ITEM 7 .56134 
ITEM 8 .50520 
ITEM 9 .62344 
I.'IEM 10 .64107 
ITEM 11 .56221 
ITEM 12 .55444 
ITEM 13 • 64302 
ITEM 14 .66060 
TABLE XI 
FINAL STATISTICS 
FACTOR EIGENVALUE 
1 8.75597 
2 3.32810 
3 2.23316 
4 1.90587 
5 1. 77006 
6 1.66795 
7 1.45543 
8 1. 37697 
9 1.28062 
10 1.24458 
11 1.19477 
12 1.10409 
13 1.08501 
14 1.02497 
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PCT OF VAR CUM PCT 
17.5 17.5 
6.7 24.2 
4.5 28.6 
3.8 32.4 
3.5 36.0 
3.3 39.3 
2.9 42.2 
2.8 45.0 
2.6 47.5 
2.5 so.a 
2.4 52.4 
2.2 54.6 
2.2 56.8 
2.0 58.9 
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Two hypotheses were tested in the present study. 'llle first 
hypothesis deals with the differences between "safe" and "unsafe" 
workers. 'llle second hypothesis concerns itself with the factor 
structures of factor loadings in American industries (Loyola Study) 
versus those in Israel (Zohar's 1980 Study). 
Hypothesis Che 
'lllere is no significant difference between "safe" and "unsafe" 
workers. 
'llle hypothesis was tested using discriminant analysis to determine 
seven scale scores. It was done to determine differences between "safe" 
and "unsafe" workers according to the seven different scales. 
'llle mOdel being presented here is a discriminant analysis. To 
begin, Box's M=S.7668. 'lllis is the discriminant result of the scale 
scores' (two groups) utilizing the scale scores as the dependent 
variable. Box's Mis a test of hanogeneity of variance. In this 
present research the variance covariance matrices are hanogeneous. 
Furthermore, in the study P=.1259 meaning that the F-Ratio (F=1.91) is 
not significant at the .12 level. 
'llle overall objectives of this discriminant analysis are: 
1. Any significant difference between the K groups (2) are 
measured by P variables (7 Scale scores)-(Dependent Variable) 
i.e., are group (K) (Independent Variable) centroids different? 
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(In this study we had two groups (K) and seven (P) variables on 
scale scores. (Centroids are the multivariate means). 
2. What is the distance between the groups (centroids)? In this 
study there is an overlapping of the centroids meaning that 
there is a low probability of predicting group membership. 
3. What is the direction of the differences? (Figure 1) Group 
Centroids 1(0. 19083) 2(-0.21294). 
4. How accurately can we predict an unclassified subject into a 
group? 'Ille discriminante analysis classification results 
indicate that 57.99% of grouped cases were correctly 
classified. 
Using a linear canbination, the centroids were plotted as shown in 
Figure 1. 'Ille large degree of overlap causes errors in predictability. 
A two group discriminant analysis is similar to regression analysis 
using a durnny variables. (With two groups, there is one function only, 
and with three groups there are two functions; with 4 groups there are 
three functions for predicting group membership. 'Illere is always one 
less function than the number of groups). 
In this present study ROA's V has been utilized meaning that all of 
the questions are answered simultaneously in a stepwise procedure. 
Presented here in this analysis are a group correlation matrix, a 
covariance matrix, plot of the centroid means, &:>x's M test of 
FIGURE 1 
GROUP CENTROIDS 
(CANONICAL DISCRIMINANT FUNCTIONS 
EVALUATED AT GROUP MEANS) 
.190 .212 
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hanogeneity, means and the standard deviations, and a correlation 
matrix. A prior probability of 0.5 was used for each group. (Total 
number of cases NA=183 A=164-a difference of 19 cases). 1he 
64 
Standardized classification function was used because of the significant 
differences of means and standard deviations; otherwise, the 
unstandardized function would have been used. 
' RAO's V is a measure of the distance between the two centroids. 
Its significance is tested by the size of the F-ratio. 1he results of 
the stepwise procedure are SUrTillarized in Tables XIV to XVI. 
TABLE XII 
Stepwise Variable Selection 
Selection Rule: Maximize RAO's V 
Maximum No. of steps 
Minimum Tolerance Level 
Minimum F to enter 
Maximum F to enter 
Minimum Increase in RAO's V 
14 
0.00100 
1.0000 
1.0000 
.0 
1he largest F value is the most significant F which is 8.92 in 
scale 3. 1his means that Scale 3, with an F value of 8.92, has more 
variability than any other scale. Scale 3, then, will be the first 
variable entered into the equation. 
Variable 
Scale 1 
Scale 2 
Scale 3 
Scale 4 
Scale 5 
Scale 6 
Scale 7 
TABLE XIII 
Variables Not in the Analysis after Step 0 
Tolerance 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
Wilk' s Lambda 
Equivalent F 
RAO's V 
Min. Tolerance 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
TABLE XIV 
WILK'S LAMBDA 
.974 
8.926 
8.926 
F to enter RAO's V 
1-345 
1-345 
1 
7.85 
.81 
8.92 
2.32 
2.29 
.42 
2.03 
7.85 
8.92 
2.32 
2.29 
2.03 
0.0030 
0.0028 
At step one, scale three had the largest F value (8.92) which is 
the only one included. It is highly significant at the .003 level and 
it is significant in predicting group membership. Lambda (.974) will 
always be 1.0 or less. Unlike RAO's V, the smaller the Lambda value the 
more significant it will be. 
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TABLE XV 
Variables Not in the Analysis After Step 1 
Variable Tolerance Min. Tolerance F to enter RAO's 
Scale 1 0.96 0.96 5.02 14. 10 
Scale 2 1.00 1.00 • 75 
Scale 4 0.99 0.99 2.03 11.01 
Scale 5 0.99 0.99 2.61 11.61 
Scale 6 0.99 0.99 .53 
Scale 7 0.99 0.99 2.59 11.59 
Table XVI shows the proportions of in group variability not 
accounted for by Scale 3. This means that the proportion of in group 
variablity is not accounted for by the first variable in the equation. 
This will change each time more variables are added to the equation. 
The most significant variable in the prediction of group membership 
is Scale 3. Included are all items in scale 3. The Standardized 
Canonical function coefficients were used to provide classification 
results. 'Illese are weight values and they determine the correct and 
incorrect classifications in the study. 
TABLE XVI 
CLASSIFICATION FUNCTION COEFFICIENTS 
(Fisher's Linear Discriminant Function) 
Scale 1 
Scale 3 
(Constant) 
1 No-Accident 
• 707 
.999 
-27. 15 
2 Accident 
• 736 
.948 
-27 .30 
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TABLE XVII 
Canonical Discriminant Functions 
CANONICAL 
FUNCTION EIGENVAWE % VARIANCE Clff.1ULATIVE % CORRELATION LAMBDA CHI SQ DF SIGNIFICANCE 
1 .04087 100.00 100.00 0.198 
A is associated within Canonical Discriminant function 
which accounts for 19.8% of Variablity. 
Standardized Canonical Discriminant 
Function G:>eff icients 
Function 1 x81 , G1 = 42.31 
x81 , G2 = 44.87 
x 83 , G1 = 23.01 
x 83 G2 = 21.27 
Scale 1 - 0.61 
Scale 3 0.67 
(Provides misclassification 
results Relative size indicates 
degree of importance) 
, 
If x1 > x2 then the person will be classifieCI into group 1. 
X s 1 ,G1 ( - . 61 ) 
Xs1 ,G2 (-.61) 
0.96 13.7 2 .0010 
My one score for an individual can be abbreviated. For example: 
Score Y1 = .707 (Scale 1) + .999 (Scale 3) - (-27.15) 
Y2 = .736 (Scale 1) + .948 (Scale 3) - (-27.30) 
If Y 1 .> Y 2 Then the person belongs in G1 
If Y2). y 1 II II II II II G2. 
Using these values we can predict group membership for an 
unclassified member in a group. In this study we can predict group 
membership with only a 57.99% accuracy. 
The larger the function coefficient (weight) the more important the 
variable. The closer they are together the less the predictibility. 
The eigenvalue of .04087 is directly related to the proportion of 
variability included in the present study. The larger the eigenvalue 
the greater the proportion of variability accounted for. Therefore, 
.198 is 19.8% of the total variability. Scale 1 and Scale 3 together 
canprise 19.8% of the variability. 
The group 1 and group 2 means indicate much overlapping. As a 
result, there is not much predictability. The percent of "grouped" 
cases correctly classified in this study is 57.99 percent. 
Hypothesis Part B 
This is a surrma.ry of the tests for statistical significance of part 
B of Hypothesis one which states that: There is no significant 
difference between "safe" and "unsafe" workers as defined by all 50 
items of the Holmes/Zohar Safety Climate Attitudinal Inventory the 
evaluation instrument. Presented here are the following: discriminant 
analysis including a group correlation matrix; canonical discriminant 
functions; plot of the centroid means; Box's test of hanogeniety; means 
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FIGURE 2 
Canonical Discriminate Functions 
Evaluated at Group Mean (Group Centroids) 
Group Functton1 
0.190 
2 -0.212 
2 
I I I 
·: Ir. 
-0.21 0.19 
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and standard deviations; F scores; Fisher's Classification Function and 
other classification results. 
Box's Mis a test of hanogeneity and in this analysis it states 
whether or not the variance covariance matrices are the sane for each 
item score. 'Ille Box's is was 96.37 which means that the variance 
covariance matrices are hanogeous. 
In the present study, P = 0. 1200 which means that the F ratio is 
most likely independent at the 0.12 level. 
'Ille overall objectives in testing part B of the hypothesis, using 
discriminant analysis on the 50 items, are as follows: 
1. Is there any significant difference between the K groups 
(Groups 1 & 2) the independent variable, as measured by P 
variables, the dependent variable inventory items (50)? (i.e., 
are the group centroids different)? In this part of the study 
we had two groups (K) and fifty (P) variables or inventory 
itans. 
2. Determine the distance between the groups (centroids). 
Evaluation of the Canonical Discriminant Functions indicated 
the following means: 
Group Function 1 
1 0.32161 
2 - 0.35888 
3. 'Ille overlapping of the group means (centroids) results in a 
fairly low probability of predicting group membership. 
4. 'Ille percent of accuracy in predicting an unclassified subject 
into a group is 65.88% which is the percent of "group" cases 
70 
FIGURE 3 
ALL-GROUP STACKED HISTOGRAM 
CANONICAL DISCRIMINATE FUNCTION 1 
GROUP CENTROIDS 
Group2 
-0.358 
Group 1 
0.321 
-3 -2 -1 2 1 2 . 3 
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+ 
+ 
+ 
correctly classified in this study. 
In Figure 3 one c~ observe a large degree of overlapping of the 
group centroids which will cause errors in predictability. 
In a two group discriminant analysis, such as this one, we have one 
independent variable, and fifty dependent variables. 
In this study, a prior probability of 0.5 was used for each group. 
The predicted group membership is illustrated in Table XXIX. 
RAO's V, illustrated in the sunnary Figure 3 actually measures the 
distance between two centroids. Its significance is tested by the size 
of the F ratio. Thus, a variable selected on the bases of RAO's V may 
be decreasing within-group cohesion while it adds to overall separation. 
When there are a large number of cases, as in this study, V has a 
sampling distribution approximately the same as chi-square with degree 
of freedom equal to p(g-1). The change in V due to the addition (or 
deletion) of variables also has a chi-square distribution with degrees 
of freedom equal to (g-1) times the number of variables, added (deleted) 
at that step. It can be used to test statistical significance of the 
change in the overall separation. A change that is not significant 
should not be included. However, even if a variable is significantly 
entered, and doesn't change much, it can have statistical significance 
but not practical significance. As the centroids are moved further 
apart, the more accurately one can predict group membership. If F is 
less than 1.0 RAO's V cannot be computed. 
In the summary table is a column for Wilk's Lambda. Item 21 has 
the highest Lambda of 0.968 which is significant at the 0.0009 level. 
Lambda's will always be 1.0 or less and the smaller it is the more 
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TABLE XXVIII 
Slff1ARY TABLE 
ACTION VARS WILKS' CHANGE 
STEP ENI'ERED RFM>VED IN LAMBDA SIG. RAO'S V SIG. IN V SIG. 
1 ITEM 21 1 0.968270 0.0009 11.31 0.0008 11.31 0.0008 
2 ITEM 34 2 o. 951136 0.0002 17. 72 0.0001 6.418 0.0113 
3 ITEM 7 3 0.941429 0.0001 21.46 0.0001 3. 740 0.0531 
4 ITEM 10 4 0.934730 0.0001 24.09 0.0001 2.626 0. 1051 
5 ITEM 19 5 0.927268 0.0001 27.06 0.0001 2.970 0.0848 
6 ITEM 45 6 0.920717 0.0001 29.71 0.0000 2.647 0.1037 
7 ITEM 43 7 0.913744 0.0001 32.57 0.0000 2.859 0.0908 
8 ITEM 15 8 0.909130 0.0001 34.48 0.0000 1. 916 o. 1663 
9 ITEM 27 9 0.905373 0.0001 36.06 0.0000 1.575 0.2095 
10 ITEM 1 10 0.902384 0.0001 37.32 0.0000 1.262 0.2612 
11 ITEM 38 11 0.899629 0.0002 38.49 0.0001 1.171 0.2792 
12 ITEM 40 12 0.895986 0.0002 40.05 0.0001 1.559 0.2118 
....... 
w 
significant it will be. Therefore, each time a variable is entered, 
providing it has statistical significance plus practical significance, 
RAO' s V wi 11 increase and Lambda wi 11 decrease. 
The Sunmary Table XXVIII includes 12 inventory items which were 
statistically significant. The table shows each item including its 
Lambda significance, RAO's V, the change in V, and its significance. In 
all cases the V's became larger as variables were added. 
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It can be noted in the _Surrmary Table XXVIII tHat item 40 is the most 
significant variable in the prediction of group membership. This is 
based on the largest V (40.05) and the smallest lambda (0.895). Item 40 
was followed by item 38 which had the second largest V (38.49) and the 
second smallest lambda (0.899). At the other end of the spectrum was 
item 21 which had the largest lambda (0.968) and the smallest V (11.31). 
Because Wilk's lambda is an inverse statistic, the variable (item 
40) which produced the smallest lambda was selected for that step. It 
should be noted that it is possible to convert lambda into an overall 
multivariate F statistic for the test of group differences. 
Fisher's classification function coefficients are equivalent to the 
unstandardized canonical function coefficients. Fisher (1936) was the 
first to suggest that classification should be based on a linear 
canbination of the discriminating variables. Fisher's theory proposes a 
linear canbination which maximizes group differences while minimizing 
variation within groups. 
Table XIX indicated a "classification function" for group, 1 and 
2, which gives the coefficients for the no-accident and accident groups. 
ITEM 1 
ITEM 7 
ITEM 10 
ITEM 15 
ITEM 19 
ITEM 21 
ITEM 27 
ITEM 34 
ITEM 38 
ITEM 40 
ITEM 43 
ITEM 45 (CONSTANT) 
TABLE XIX 
CLASSIFICATION FUNCTION COEFFICIENTS 
(FISHER'S L~ DISCRIMINANT FUNCTIONS) 
1 2 
·Nff ACCIDENTS ACCID"E}fTS 
ACSTATUS= 
1. 1322056 1.027405 
.8414785 1.066751 
-1. 152118 
-
8998055 
1.373703 1.238058 
.6615241 .4971595 
1.228256 1.458232 
2.174719 2.021821 
1.341424 1.123246 
2.008979 2. 182869 
.6096387 .431817 
3.626171 3.448424 
4.244177 4.504585 
-33.01705 -33.61921 
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By applying these coefficients to the raw score values, any one response 
of an individual can be abbreviated for example: 
Y1 = 1. 13 (Item 1) + .841 (Item 7) - (-33.01) Y2 = 1.02 (Item 1) + 1.06 (Item 7) - (-33.61) 
If Y1 } Yz Then the person belongs in G1 
If Y 2 )' Y 1 Then the person belongs in G2 
By applying these coefficients, group membership can be predicted 
for the unclassified member in a group. In this study group membership 
can be predicted with a 65.88 percent accuracy. 
If x1, G 2 x2, G 1then the person will be classified into group 1. 
The larger the function coefficient, the more important the variable. 
For example, item 10 has a weight of -0.50 which is twice as important 
as Item 15 with a function coefficient of 0.25. The closer the values 
76 
TABLE XX 
CANONICAL DISCRIMINANT FUNCTIONS 
FUNC 1 
ITEM 1 o. 18618 x11 ,G1 =3.13 
ITEM 7 -0.34301 
ITEM 10 -0.50606 x11' Gz = 3. 11 
ITEM 15 0.25644 
ITEM 19 0.29391 x17 , G1 = 3.78 
ITEM 21 -0.34092 
ITEM 27 0.24481 x17 , G2 = 4.07 
ITEM 34 0.43563 
ITEM 38 -0.24813 x17' G1 (0. 18) 
ITEM 40 0.24863 
ITEM 43 0.22633 x11 , G2 (-0.034) 
ITEM 45 -0.31158 
TABLE XXI 
S1RUC1URE MATRIX 
POOLED WITHIN-GROUPS CORRELATIONS BE1WEEN CANONICAL DISCRIMINANT 
FUNCTIONS AND DISCRIMINATING VARIABLES ARE ORDERED BY THE FUNCTION WITH 
LARGEST CORRELATION AND THE MAGNI1UDE OF WAT CORRELATION. 
ITEM 24 
ITEM 11 
ITEM 25 
ITEM 22 
ITEM 18 
ITEM 14 
ITEM 36 
ITEM 17 
ITEM 48 
ITEM 26 
ITEM 8 
ITEM 12 
ITEM 49 
ITEM 47 
ITEM 50 
ITEM 6 
ITEM 4 
ITEM 20 
ITEM 41 
ITEM 2 
ITEM 13 
ITEM 28 
ITEM 31 
ITEM 39 
ITEM 29 
FUNC 1 
-0.34835 
-0.34566 
-0.34277 
0.33795 
-0.32736 
-0.32512 
-0.30110 
-0.27946 
-0.25854 
0.24513 
-0.24464 
-0.22953 
-0.22697 
-0.22582 
0.21978 
-0.21659 
-0.21247 
-0. 19690 
-0. 15986 
-0.15840 
-0. 15822 
-0. 13983 
-0.13747 
-0. 13136 
-0. 12569 
ITEM 37 
ITEM 30 
ITEM 16 
ITEM 32 
ITEM 46 
ITEM 42 
ITEM 3 
ITEM 5 
ITEM 33 
ITEM 9 
ITEM 23 
ITEM 44 
ITEM 35 
ITEM 21 
ITEM 10 
ITEM 7 
ITEM 1 
ITEM 19 
ITEM 15 
ITEM 45 
ITEM 40 
ITEM 43 
ITEM 27 
ITEM 38 
ITEM 34 
FUNC 1 
0.12 
-0.12 
0. 11 
-0. 11 
-0.10 
0. 10 
0.09 
-0.07 
-0.04 
0.04 
-0.03 
-0.03 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
. 0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
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TABLE XXII 
CANONICAL DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION 
CANONICAL DISCRIMINANT FUNCTIONS EVALUATED AT GROUP MEANS (GROUP 
CENTROIDS) 
GROUP FUNC 1 
1 0.32161 
2 -0.35888 
TEST OF EQUALITY OF GROUP COVARIANCE MATRICES USING BOX'S M 
'!HE BANKS AND NATURAL LOGARITHMS OF DETERMINANTS PRINTED ARE '!HOSE 
GROUP LABEL BANK 
1 12 
2 ACCIDENTS 12 
POOLED WI'IHIN-GROUPS 
COVARIANCE MATRIX 12 
LOG DETERMINANT 
0.021080 
-0.236601 
o. 178695 
BOX'S M APPROXIMATE F DEGREES OF FREEDOM SIGNIFICANCE 
96.379 1, 1907 78, 366836. 7 0. 1200 
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TABLE XXIII 
NO. OF PREDICTED GROUP MEMBERSHIP 
ACTUAL GROUP CASES 1 2 
GROUP 1 198 123 75 
62.1% 37.9% 
GROUP 2 183 55 128 
ACCIDENTS 30.1% 69.9% 
UNGROUPED CASES 18 13 5 
72.2% 27.8% 
PERCENT OF "GROUPED" CASES CORRECTLY CLASSIFIED: 65.88% 
80 
are the less is the predictability. 
Next, the eigenvalue of 0. 11609 is directly related to the 
proportion of variability included in this study. 1he canonical 
correlation is a correlation coefficient of variables (ITEMS) 1, 7, 10, 
15, 19, 21, 27, 34, 38, 40, 43, and 45 (TABLE XXIV). These 
correlation coefficients relate directly to the eigenvalue. 1he larger 
the eigenvalue the greater the proportion of variability accounted for. 
1he canonical correlation of 0.325 accounts for 32.25 percent of the 
total variability. This also means that the above items account for 
32.25 percent of the variability. 
This facet of discriminant analysis was used in classifying the 
no-accident group (Group 1) and the accident group (Group 2). 
1he classifications results for the 198 cases under (Group 1), the 
no-accident group, resulted in 123 cases or 62.1% correctly classified 
as predicted. A total of 75 cases (Group 1) or 37.9% were classified 
under the predicted Group 2 membership. 
Of the 183 Group 2 (accident) cases 55 or 30.1 percent were 
classified under the Group 2 classification. fbwever, a total of 128 
cases or 69.9% were classified as predicted, under the group 2 
membership. 
Next, the ungrouped cases totaled 18 and of that number, 13 or 
72.7% fell under group 1 and only 5 or 27.8% were classified under group 
2. 1he total percent of "grouped" cases correctly classified in 65.88%. 
FAC'IDRIAL MANOVA 
1he analytic technique used here is Factorial Ma.nova with two 
independent variables and seven dependent variables. 1he mcxiel displays 
SCALE 1 
I7 
Training W:>rthy 
Investment 
Iz1 
Managers View 
Safety Reg's 
Seriously 
Iz7 
Managers Control 
Hazards 
I43 
Important for 
Supervisor to 
Point out 
Hazards 
SCALE 2 
ITEMS OF PREDICTABILITY 
RELATED S1UDY SCALE 
SCALE 3 SCALE 4 SCALE 5 SCALE 6 SCALE 7 
I15 
Chance of Acci-
dent Large 
I34 
This Factory 
Dangerous 
I38 
Dangerous 
Situation 
Reported 
I1 
Safety Caunittee 
Warning Effects 
Safety Attitude 
I10 
Safety Officer 
Influence Great 
I40 
Safety Officer 
Regulation 
Considered 
I4s 
Employees Self 
evaluation 
importance 
I19 
Status of Belong-
ing to Safety 
Caunittee Sign-
ificant 
00 
I-' 
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independent and dependent variables in a 2 X 2 MANOVA for fixed effects. 
All treatment effects are presented about which inferences will be made. 
Descriptive statistics, cell means and standard deviations are displayed 
for the no-accident group (1) High Risk and group (2) low Risk 
companies. 'Ihe variable Patho labels the individual company's risk 
rating. 'Ihe value labels for Patho are (1) "High Risk" and (2) for "Low 
risk". 
'Ihe discriminating varibles are accident status groups (1, 2) and 
Patho (Risk Level)(1,2). Multivariate Analysis of Variance (Ma.nova) 
Scales were formed for Scales one through seven. Data included a 
correlation matrix with the standard deviation, diagonal cell 
means-versus variances for each scale, Box plots for all variables 
(Scales); plus multivariate and univariate tests of significance. 
'Ihere is no need to provide a graph of the interaction effects 
because the first order multivariate test of interaction is not 
significant. 'Ihe hypothesis for interaction using the multivariate test 
of significant (effect of accident status by Patho) is presented. 
Finally, a review of the total findings and conclusions for the entire 
data set are presented and discussed. Cell means and standard deviation 
were calculated initially for these data. Because of the wide 
discrepancies, and especially the large differences in the number of 
cases in the high risk and low risk groups, the multivariate test (Group 
Centroids) for hanogeneity indicated non-hanogeneity of dispersion 
matrices. 
TABLE XXV 
MULTIVARIATE TEST FOR H(}.1()GENEITY OF DISPERSION MA1RICES 
BOX M = 
F WI1H (84, 15649) DF = 
CHI-SQUARE WI1H 84 DF -
194. 13399 
2.21830, p = 
186.44087, p = 
Ho : Cf,:' = ~ = Jr-- = /("'" REJECT Ho 
.000 (APPROX.) 
.000 (APPROX.) 
12, U~l U2~ 
For ea~h of ~e c~rrel!rion matrices, there is a corresponding 
covariance matrix. Box's M shows that the correlation matrices and 
covariance matrices are not equal. Therefore, the test that the 
variance/covariance matrices are equal has been rejected at the .OS 
level. The major discrepancy here is the fact that the N's are quite 
different between groups 1 and 2. With equal N's in the cells, 
hanogeneity of variance could have resulted. In view of this, we can 
assume that the variance/covariance matrices of the four cells are 
significantly different in terms of the overall significance. Past 
research has found that the assumption of hanogeneity of 
variance-covariance matrices is not critical and that further analysis 
may be performed. 
\ 
The cell means and standard deviations are listed for each of the 
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seven scales and for the high risk and low risk groups (See Table XXIII). 
The cell means of Scale 1, for both of the low risk groups, appear 
to be significantly higher than the high risk group means. The low risk 
means for Scale 2 are slightly higher than the high risk means. They 
are not to be considered significant. 
The reverse is true in Scale 3 where the means for the high risk 
groups, 1 and 2, are both significantly higher than the low risk means. 
ni.ere appears to be sane significance here. (See Appendix X). 
Scale 4, low risk means are slightly higher for the low risk groups 
1 and 2. 1here appears to be low significance here between the high 
risk and low risk groups. 1he same can be said for Scale S where the 
low risk means are slightly elevated over the high risk mean values. 
Similiar results are reported for Scales 6 and 7 where the differences 
are small. 
In Scales 2, 3 and 7 all of the low risk means were below the 
average mean for the entire sample. 1he means for the low risk group, 
overall, were higher than the high risk group means. 1he safety climate 
inventory items which were adminstered were similar for all groups. the 
effect of PATHO (RISK VARIABLE) or Multivariate Tests of Significance 
were rejected at the .OS level of significance. 
Test Name 
Pillais 
Hotel lings 
Wilks 
Roys 
Value 
. 197 
.246 
.• 802 
.197 
I:() : M1 • = M2. 
2.. 2.. 
Aprox. F 
11.86 
11.86 
11.86 
TABLE XXVI 
H of F 
7.00 
7.00 
7.00 
P = .000 (Risk Var.) 
Reject Ho atcA = .OS 
Error DF 
337.0 
337.0 
337.0 
Sign of F 
.000 
.000 
.000 
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TABLE XXVII 
1he effect on accident status. Multivariate Tests of Significance. 
Test Name 
Pillais 
Hotellings 
Wilks 
Roys 
Value 
.050 
.052 
.949 
.050 
Aprox. F 
2.54 
2.54 
2.54 
H of F 
7.00 
7.00 
7.00 
HO: M1. = Ml. P = .014 (Accident Status) 
2.. 2. 
Reject HO ate?\ .OS 
Reject HO 
(Variable) 
Error DF 
337.00 
337.00 
337.00 
Sign of F 
.014 
.014 
.014 
'lhe Multivariate test for interaction indicates the test for 
interaction is not significant. 
TABLE XXVIII 
EFFECT ACSTAWS BY PATHO 
MULTIVARIATE TESTS OF SIGNIFIANCE (S - 1, M = 2 1/2, N = 167 1/2) 
Test Name 
Pillais 
Hotellings 
Wilks 
Roys 
Value Aprox. F 
.01375 .67120 
.01394 .67120 
.98625 .67120 
.01375 
H of F 
7.00 
7.00 
7.00 
Error DF 
337 .00 
337.00 
337 .00 
Sign of F 
.696 
.696 
.696 
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UNIVARIATE F-TESTS WIIB (21,343) D.F. 
VARIABLE HYPOIB. SS ERROR SS 
SCALE 1 3649.53788 21261.42407 
SCALE 2 8.95682 6551.37160 
SCALE 3 633. 79613 9416.53083 
SCALE 4 127.88314 4835.52103 
SCALE 5 213.87111 5501.69871 
SCALE 6 9.43999 3680.98107 
SCALE 7 12.36096 4746.69105 
TABLE XXIX 
UNIVARIATE F TESTS (RISK) 
HYPOIH. MS ERROR MS 
3649.53788 61.98666 
8.95682 19. 10021 
633. 79613 27.45344 
127.88314 14.09773 
213.87111 16.03994 
9.43999 10.73172 
12.36096 13.83875 
F 
58.87618 
.46894 
23.08622 
9.07119 
13.33366 
.87963 
.89321 
SIG. OF F 
.000 
.494 
.000 
.003 
.000 
.349 
.345 
00 
°' 
TABLE XXX 
UNIVARIATE F TESTS (ACC. 
UNIVARIATE F- TESTS WITH (1,343) D.F. 
VARIABLE HYPO'lli. SS ERROR SS HYPOTH. MS 
SCALE 1 567.03102 21261.42407 567.03102 
SCALE 2 15.46562 6551.37160 15.46562 
SCALE 3 260.81610 9416.53083 260.81610 
SCALE 4 33.50293 . 4835.52103 33.50293 
SCALE 5 38. 12935 5501.69871 38. 12935 
SCALE 6 4.59554 3680.98107 4.59554 
SCALE 7 28.22279 4746.69105 28.22279 
STAWS) 
ERROR MS 
61.98666 
19. 10021 
27.45344 
14.09773 
16.03994 
10. 73172 
13.83875 
F 
9. 14763 
.80971 
9.50031 
2.37648 
2.37715 
.42822 
2.03940 
SIG. OF F 
.003 
.369 
.002 
.124 
.124 
.513 
.154 
00 
...... 
The univariate F-test showed that Scales 1, 3, 4 and S were 
significant as displayed in Table XXIX. 
SCALE 1 HO: M,1.1=M,2.1 Reject HO for 
Effect of Patho .OS d.. 
SCALE 2- HO: M,1.2 = M,2.2 r:o not reject HO 
Effect of Patho .OS~ 
SCALE 3 !{): M,1.3 = M,2.3 Reject HO for 
Effect of Pa tho .OS IA 
SCALE 4 !{): M,1.4 = M,2.4 Reject HO for 
Effect of Patho .oso<. 
SCALE S HO: M,1.S = M,2.S Reject HO for 
Effect of Patho .OSol... 
SCALE 6 !{): M,1.6 = M,2.6 r:o not reject HO 
Effect of Patho .OS <:J... 
SCALE 7 !{): M, 1.7 = M,2.7 I::o not reject HO 
Effect of Patho .OS~ 
PA'IHO = RISK VARIABLE 
Scales 1 , 3, 4 and S (dependent variables) were found to be 
significant for the risk groups 1 and 2. The others are not even close 
to being significant at the .OS level. 
(Wilk's Lambda= .802 for the dimension reduction analysis. The 
eigenvalue for the risk variable is .246 and the Canonical correlation 
is .444. This means that 44.4% of the risk variance is attributed to 
Scales 1, 3, 4 and S). 
SCALE 1 HO: M, 1. 1 = M, 2. 1 Rejected HO for 
Effect of Ace Status .OS ol..... 
SCALE 2 HO: M, 1.2 = M,2.2 I::o not Reject HO 
Effect of Ace Status .OS rA 
SCALE 3 HO: M,1.3 = M,2.3 Reject HO 
Effect of Ace Status .OS o} 
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SCALE 4 HO: M, 1.4 = M,2.4 Ib not Reject HO 
Effect of Ace Status .OS~ 
SCALE S HO: M, 1.S ':= M,2.S Ib not Reject 00 
.osol. Effect of Ace Status 
SCALE 6 HO: M,1.6 = M,2.6 Ib not Reject HO 
Effect of Ace Status .OS rJ.... 
SCALE 7 HO: M,1.7 = M,2.7 Ib not Reject HO 
Effect of Ace Status .OS~ 
Here the Univariate F tests show that Scales 1 and 3 (dependent 
variables) are found to be significant for accident status groups 1 and 
3. The others are not close to being significant at the .OS level. 
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The accident status eigenvalue is .OS2 and the canonical 
correlation is .224. This means that 22.4 percent of the accident 
status variables were accounted for in Scales 1 and 3. The other Scales 
were not significant. 
FURTHER ANALYSIS 
The initial step was to study the SO items ;included in the Safety 
Climate Attitude Inventory. The SO items in the test instrument were 
analyzed to determine why 12 of the SO items discriminated 
significantly. In Table XXXI the items which discriminated 
significantly are listed below each of the five scales fran which these 
12 items were derived. 
It should be noted here that none of the 12 discriminating items 
relates to Scale 2, (Effect of Safe Conduct on Pranotion) and Scale 6, 
(Enforcement vs. Guidance). 
Displayed in Table XXXII are the variables not included in the 
analysis after step 1. Scale 2 and 6 both have F's to enter less than 
SCALE 1 
I 7 - Training 
Worthy Inveeit-
ment 
I21 - Manager 
views safety 
reg's seriously 
I27 - Manager 
controls 
Hazards 
I43 - Supervisor 
points out 
hazard 
TABLE XXXI 
RELATIONSHIP OF DISCRIMINATING ITEMS TO SCALES 
SCALE 3 
RISK 
I34 - This 
Factory is 
Dangerous 
Iis -·chance 
of accident 
large 
SCALE 4 
TRAINING 
I3a - Danger-
our situation 
reported 
SCALE 5 
STATUs-s.o. 
11 - Safety 
conunittee 
warning affects 
behavior 
Ito - Safety 
officer influ-
ence great 
I40 - Safety 
officer reg' s 
considered 
SCALE 7 
SOCIAL STA'lUS 
I19 - Safety 
belonging to 
safety comm-
ttee 
145 - Employ-
ees self 
Evaluation 
important 
\0 
0 
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TABLE XXXII 
VARIABLE NOT IN ANALYSIS 
MINIMUM 
VARIABLE TOLERANCE TOLERANCE F TO ENTER RAO'S V 
SCALE 1 0.9636851 0.9636851 5.0288 14. 10010 
SCALE 2 1.0000000 1.0000000 .79018 
SCALE 4 0.9993027 0.9993027 2.0337 11.01856 
SCALE 5 0.9983282 0.9983282 2.6124 11.61396 
SCALE 6 0.9991893 0.9991893 .53327 
SCALE 7 .0.9953158 0.9953158 2.5981 11.59926 
1.0. Prior to entering, a variable into the equation, F must equal 1.0 
or greater. It was reported earlier in the study that Scale 3 had the 
largest F value (8.92) and Scale 1 had an F to enter of (5.02). In 
addition RAO's Vis nil for both Scales 2 and 6. 1his explains why none 
of the variables entered under Scales 2 and 6 had any statistical 
significance. 
1he F values of the subsequent scales were: Scale 4 (F = 2.03); 
Scale S(F = 2.6); and Scale 7 (F =2.59) (Table XXXII). 
1hen, according to Fisher's Linear Discriminant Function, Scale 3 
had a classification function coefficient of .999 resulting in the 
highest scale predictability for the unclassified member in a group. 
This was followed by Scale 1 which resulted in a classification function 
coefficient of .707. Using both of these values, group membership can 
be predicted for an unclassified member of a group. However, it must be 
a member of a group. However, it must be remembered that Scales 1 and 3 
account for only 19.8 percent of the total variability and the total 
prediction of group membership in reported at 57.99% accuracy. 
In conclusion, the Scales, the dependent variable in this study, 
are based on the fact the P = . 1259 and the percent of "grouped" cases 
correctly classified, means that predictability is low using scale 
scores. 
1he item results are reported in Table XXXIX labeled Item 
Intercorrelation. Indicated are levels of intercorrelation between 
Scales 1, 5 and 6 based on using all 50 items for item correlation, with 
the 12 items of high predictibility. (Table XXXIX) 1he Pooled 
Within-Groups Correlation matrix was used to determine 
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intercorrelation of items as well as intracorrelation, which occured is 
Scales 3 and 7. A minimum correlation level of .30 was established. It 
is possible to make sane comparisons. Che major finding is that Scale 1 
is highly intercorrelated with Scale S. The intercorrelation matrix 
shows that the following items in Scale 1 are intercorrelated with Scale 
S (110, 117, I3, I40). Scale S items intercorrated with two of the 
three Scale 1 high predictability items which are: <r11, r21 , I 24, r25, 
127, 136 & 143). In analyzing item identifications, one can empirically 
note the close management attitude correlations between the variables 
(items) in Scales 1 and S. 
The.conclusion which can be drawn here is that Scale 1 (management 
attitude) and Scale S (Status of Safety Officer) would logically fit 
together, because in all organizations studied, the safety officer was 
part of management. The analysis of the intercorrelation matrix 
concerning Scales 1 and S support this theory. In fact, the effect of 
Scale 1 (Management Attitude) can probably be extended to include all 
seven scales to sane degree. The results of the SO item analysis is 
more valuable than the outcane of the scale scores. Another conclusion 
is that the TOTAL SCALE, should be used because of the increased 
effectiveness of measuring in seven different areas simultaneously. It 
is the total scale which discriminates. An analysis including all SO 
items could be accomplished through direct solution. This procedure 
will increase the percentage of predictability, possibly to as high as 
8S percent, canbining SO items plus the 7 scales. 
Scale three (Risk Level) is composed of two items of high 
predictability (115, 134) which intracorrelate with items (122 , & 126 ) 
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with a correlation of .43. 1he fact that the two highly predictive 
items (I15, I34 ) plus the two intracorrelative items (I22, Iz6) with 
correlations of .43 within Scale 3, resulted in the F ratio of 8.92,the 
highest of all seven scales. 1his is an example of nrulticolinearity or 
combined intracorrelation. In this present study, analysis is necessary 
of both "inter" and "intra" correlation, the latter occuring in Scales 3 
and 7. 
Scale 6, (F.nforcement vs. G.iidance) which was not included as a 
discriminating scale, consisted of a number of items correlating with 
Scale 1 (Management Attitude). Again, it can be concluded that the 
management scale has many overiding implictions on the other scales. 
In studying the correlation matrix, high positive correlations were 
found in scales 1 and 3; whereas, moderate to low correlations resulted 
in Scales 4 and 5. It is interesting to note that all correlations in 
Scale 7 were insignif icant--below .30. 
It can also be concluded that some of the Scale structures are more 
significant than others because of less error, a larger sampling and 
increased variability. When numerous means are related to one another, 
such as occured in Scale 3, parameters are formed. 
Based on the forgoing results, it is believed that by using a 
broader base of all 7 scales and all 50 items, an instrument can be 
developed with high predicability of group membership (Cronbach's Alpha 
. 86). 
1he Cronbach coefficient alpha fornrula in this study has been 
applied to each subsurvey separately to estimate the reliability (in the 
internal-consistency sense) of the seven subsurveys. 1he Cronbach 
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fol11lula was applied to the set of reliability estimates, subsurvey 
intercorrelations, and subsurvey (Scale) variances to obtain an estimate 
of reliability of the total study. Tile reliability coefficients for 
Scale one which includes 12 inventory items (variables) has a 
standardized item alpha of .8649 which is the highest of the seven 
scales. 
Hypothesis 1Wo 
· Tilere is no similarity between factor structures of factor loadings 
in .American industries versus those in Israel. Hypothesis two was 
tested using Zohar's original 40 item safety climate questionnaire. Tile 
data were factor analyzed with spssx utilizing principal canponent 
factor analysis with Varima.x rotation. Table VI displays the 8 factors 
which were obtained. A canparison of factor structure and item loadings 
between Tile .American (Loyola) and Zohar's Israeli (1980) study indicates 
significant differences. 
Tile results depicted in Table VI shows the actual results of 
canparing Zohar's original 40 items with Tile .American sample. Zohar's 
Israeli Study Table II lists the order of factors using Eigenvalue and 
percent of variance. Tilis is followed by the raw number of items which 
loaded on each factor. Table III illustrating the American study, 
provides the same kind of information. Tables IV and V list the item 
numbers loading on each factor is Zohar's and the Loyola studies. 
Tile next Table VI is canparison of factor's structure and item 
number similarities related to factors. 1Wo major differences can be 
noted between the two studies by analyzing the table. First, there is a 
significant difference in the order of factor descriptions based on the 
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principal-canponent factor analysis. Second, the item loadings on 
factors. (Zohar's No's.) 3 and 7 s~ow differences. Items 1, 2, 4, 5,. 6, 
and 7 have similar item loadings. However, major differences resulted 
in the ordering of the factor structures indicated by a canparison of 
eigenvalues. For example, in Zohar's factor structure, the perceived 
imporance of safety training was the highest, with an eigenvalue of 
(9.84). In The American study, the perceived management attitudes 
toward safety factor was in ranked number one with the eigenvalue of 
(7.74). Number 2, in Zohar's study was the perceived management 
attitudes toward safety with an eigenvalue of (4.63). Second place in 
The American study was perceived status of the safety officer with an 
eigenvalue of (2.92). Zohar's number three factor was the perceived 
effects of safety conduct on pranotion with an eigenvalue of (2.11). In 
the third place in The American study, was the perceived effects of 
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safety conduct on social status with an eigenvalue of (2 •. 11), perceived 
level of risk at workplace was number 4 in Zohar's study--eigenvalue of 
(2.34). The perceived effects of safety conduct on pranotion was number 
4 in The American study with an eigenvalue of ( 1 • 72). Zohar reported 
perceived effect of required work pace on safety as number 5--eigenvalue 
of (1.66), Number 5 in The American study was perceived level of risk in 
the workplace--eigenvalue (11.49). The perceived status of safety 
officer was 6 in Zohar's study--eigenvalue of (1.17). Number 6 in The 
American study was; perceived effects or required work pace as safety with 
an eigenvalue of (11.42). Seventh place in Zohar's study was perceived 
effects of safe conduct on social status--eigenvalue (1.07). Zohar's 
number one factor, perceived importance of safety training programs were 
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TAB~E XXXIII 
CONSTRUCT CHART 
x S.D. 
Scale 1 1-42.31 Scale 1 1-8.66 
2-44.87 2-8. 31 
Total 43.52 Total 8.58 
Scale 2 1-17.07 Scale 2 1-4.47 
2-17.49 2-4.23 
Total 17.27 Total 4.35 
Scale 3 1-23.01 Scale 3 1-5.06 
2-21.27 2-5.75 
Total 22.19 Total 5.46 
Scale 4 1-21. 53 Scale 4 1-3.97 
2-22 .15 2-3.58 
Total 21.82 Total 3.80 
Scale 5 1-15.41 Scale 5 1-3.90 
2-16.07 2-4.25 
Total 15. 72~ Total 4.08 
Scale 6 1-18.14 Scale 6 1-3.43 
2-18.37 2-3.08 
Total 18.25 Total 3.26 
Scale 7 1-23. 40 Scale 7 1-3.93 
2-23. 97 2-3.47 
Total 23.67 Total 3. 72 
N= 1-183 2-164 
rated seventh in 1he American study--eigenvalues (1.26). B::'Jth Zohar's 
and the .American study rated perceived status of a safety conmittee as 
number 8 eigenvalue--Zohar (.84); .American (1.20). 
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In view of the aoove differences between Zohar's Israeli study and 
1he .American study the null hypothesis is not rejected. 1he null 
hypothesis stated that there is no similarity between factor structures 
of factor loadings in .Amer·ican industries versus those in Israel. 
Sunmary 
Many of the differences between Zohar's factor structures and those 
in the Loyola Study can be attributed to cultural differences between 
the two countries and major philosophical differences between labor 
unions in .America and Isreal. Ibv Kahana, a business executive with 
Cambridge Associates, 9933 Lawlor, Skokie, Illinois, had 25 years of 
work related experiences in several Israeli industrial organizations. 
He pointed out major differences between Israeli labor unions and those 
in the U.S •• 'Ille major Israeli labor union is called Hestardruth. It 
. 
covers about Seventy percent of the blue collar workers. 1his Israeli 
Union has different branches, i.e. teachers, welders, airline pilots 
etc. 
1he Hestardruth provides a wide range of benefits and which are 
administered by the Israeli government. 1he union provides much 
protection for the employee. In order to discharge a blue collar 
worker, after one year of service, is extremely difficult because the 
Israeli worker is actually tenured following his/her first year of 
employment. 
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Lbv Kahana pointed out that the union is very democratic, and 
elections are conducted annually; whereas, in most .American labor 
organizations, those in power, are appointed by a few union leaders who 
control the union, e.g.~ Teamsters, UAW etc. 
The fact that most Israeli workers enjoy a great deal more security 
fran the threat of being fired, will affect their psychological 
attitude. The fact that Zohar's number one factor was the employee's 
perceived importance of safety training programs can be related to the 
Israeli blue collar worker who doesn't need to fear the threat of being 
laid off, and he/she perceives safety training as being highly important 
in preventing a serious accident to him/her individually. Evidently, 
Israeli workers perceive safety training as a basic need. This can be 
related to Maslow's prepotency theory which means that higher needs of 
workers cannot emerge until lower ones have first been satisfied. In 
the case of the typical Israeli worker, because of union protection and 
tenure, the lower level need of job secutriy has been satisfied. 
Maslow's Theory of human behavior, on the basis of hierarchy of needs, 
can be related to improving and developing a healthy psychological 
safety climate. 
In contrast, .American workers perceive management, including the 
canpany's chief executive officer, safety officer and/or supervisor, as 
the major canponents of an industrial organization's safety climate. 
Based on the .American factor structure, in this study, employees 
perceived top ''management carmitment" to safety as the main individual 
worker's psychological perception toward anyone in management who U.S. 
workers perceived to share the major responsibility for safety. 
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'Ihe influence of U.S. labor unions on workers is important because 
of the apparent split between labor and management on safety issues. If 
we analyze the safety climate inventory item on management attitude, it 
is stated as a question; how do you perceive management attitude toward 
safety? 'Ihe nature of this question as well as many others in the 
inventory will, no doubt, produce certain abstractions. We are dealing 
with perceptual concepts which lend themselves to a certain degree of 
inference and individual workers may express feelings in totally 
different ways. Another thing to consider, is the level of effect that 
certain labor organizational practices have on an individual's 
perceptions toward management, pranotion etc. 
Another matter related by Israeli employees in Zohar's study, is 
that of morale. According to Kahana, the morale of typical Israeli 
workers is quite low. Although, the Israeli employee appears to have 
more job security than his or her counterpart in the U.S., they also 
have an excellent social security plan and canplete medical coverage 
paid by the state. 
After discussing this present study with Ibv Kahana, it was 
possible to analyze why the typical Israeli worker perceived safety 
training as being more important then management attitude. 'Ihe Israeli 
worker ranked his/her perception of the safety officer, effects of safe 
conduct on social status and the status of the safety canmittee as 
factors 6, 7, and 8. In contrast the American worker rated the 
perceived status of the safety officer as factor 2 and the perceived 
effects of safety conduct on social status as factor number 3. 
Since safety climate is based on personal perceptions and affects 
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on attitude, it can be instrumental in developing the employee's safety 
behavior. In making the canparison between Israeli and American workers 
we need to consider organizational climate (high security vs low 
security) which may affect employee behavior by; defining the stimuli 
which confront the employee, placing roadblocks on the freedan of choice 
of behavior, and/or rewarding and punishing behavior. Perceptions are 
influenced by abilities, values and personality traits, cultural 
differences, and labor organizational climate as they were perceived by 
the worker as well as his/her personal roles and/or goals, can be a 
major source of conflict. 
TABLE XXXIV 
LISTED BELOW ARE THE RELIABILITY COEFFICIENTS FOR 
'!HE SEVEN SCALES FROM HIGH TO LOW: 
SCALE 
1 
5 
2 
4 
3 
7 
6 
N = 363 
STANDARDIZED ITEM ALPHA 
.9649 
.6855 
.6742 
.6582 
.6255 
.4874 
.2823 
AVE .. 6111 
Scale 1 should be classified as having a strong positive Alpha 
Coefficient; whereas, Scales 5, 2, 4, and 3 would be rated as having a 
moderate positive reliability coefficient. Scale 7 and 6 have weak 
reliability coefficients on the positive side. The average Alpha for 
all seven scales is .6111 or moderately positive. 
MEAN 
ITEM SO 2.4628 
# OF CASES = 363.0 
STATISTICS FOR 
PART 1 
PART 2 
SCALE 
MEAN 
81.5455 
80.8843 
162.4298 
TABLE XXXV 
SPEARMAN BROWN SPLIT-HALF 
RELIABILITY ANALYSIS 
sm DEV 
1.2704 
CASES 
363.0 
VARIANCE sm DEV VARIABLES 
146. 1160 
100.4949 
406.4004 
12.0878 
10.0247 
20. 1594 
25 
25 
50 
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ITEM MEANS MEAN MINIMUM MAXIMUM RANGE MAX/MIN VARIANCE 
PART 1 3.2618 1. 7052 3.8981 2. 1928 2.2859 .2963 
PART 2 3.2354 2.377.4 4.0275 1.6941 1.6941 .2254 
SCALE 3.2486 1.7052 4.0275 2.3223 22.3619 .2557 
RELIABILITY COEFFICIENTS SO ITEMS 
CORRELATION BETWEEN FORMS = .6593 EQUAL LENG'IB SPEARMAN-BROWN = . 7947 
GUTIMAN SPLIT-HALF = 
ALPHA FOR PART 1 = 
25 ITEMS IN PART 1 
• 7864 UNEQUAL-LENG'IB SPEARMAN-BROWN = . 7947 
. 7831 ALPHA FOR PART 2 = 
25 ITEMS IN PART 2 
• 7256 
TABLE XXXVI 
CRONBACH'S ALPHA COEFFICIENT 
MEAN SID DEV CASES 
ITEM 50 2.4628 1.2704 363.0 
STATISTICS FOR MEAN VARIANCE SID DEV VARIABLES 
SCALE 
162.4298 406.4004 20. 1594 50 
ITEM MEANS MEAN MINIMUM MAXIMUM RANGE MAX/MIN 
3.2486 1. 7052 4.0275 2.3223 2.3619 
RELIABILITY COEFFICIENTS 50 ITEMS 
ALPHA = • 8528 STANDARDIZED ITEM ALPHA = .8599 
VARIANCE 
.2557 
Spearman-Brown split-half reliability coefficient on items 1 
through 50 resulted in an Alpha for part 1 of .7831 and an Alpha for 
part 2 of .7256 compared with Cronbach's Alpha C.Oefficient of .8599. 
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&ith of these reliability coefficients indicate a high reliability 
coefficient. Furthermore, in an internal-consistency sense, the total 
reliability of the 50 inventory items is high. 
ITEM 5 
ITEM 6 
ITEM 7 
ITEM 11 
ITEM 14 
ITEM 18 
ITEM 21 
ITEM 24 
ITEM 25 
ITEM 27 
ITEM 36 
ITEM 43 
N 
STATISTICS FOR 
SCALE 
ITEM MEANS 
TABLE XXXVII . 
CHRONBACH'S ALPHA/HOLMES SURVEY S1UDY 
RELIABILITY ANALYSIS-SCALE (ONE) 
MEAN STD DEV 
3.7741 1.1485 
3.5510 1.2189 
3.8981 1.0658 
3.6364 1.2077 
3.3278 1. 1776 
3.4766 1.2015 
3.4738 1.0360 
3.2645 1. 1474 
3.7796 1.0517 
3.4959 1.0934 
3.5840 1.0850 
4.0275 .9069 
= 363.0 
MEAN VARIANCE STD DEV VARIABLES 
43.2893 72.9023 8.5383 12 
CASES 
363.0 
363.0 
363.0 
363.0 
363.0 
363.0 
363.0 
363.0 
363.0 
363.0 
363.0 
363.0 
MEAN MINIMUM MAXIMUM RANGE MAX/MIN 
3.6074 3.2645 4.0275 .7631 1.2338 
RELIABILITY COEFFICIENTS 12 ITEMS 
ALPHA = STANDARDIZED ITEM ALPHA= .9649 
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VARIANCE 
.0515 
TABLE XXXVIII 
RELIABILITY ANALYSIS - SCALE (1WO) 
MEAN 
ITEM 4 2.9201 
ITEM 29 3.3361 
ITEM 30 2.5840 
ITEM 33 2.5647 
ITEM 35 3.0413 
ITEM 39 2.8815 
N = 363.0 
.· STATISTICS FOR MEAN 
SCALE 17.3278 
STD DEV 
1.4666 
1.0232 
1. 1421 
1.1649 
1.0673 
1.1024 
VARIANCE STD DEV 
18.7624 4.3316 
CASES 
363.0 
363.0 
363.0 
363.0 
363.0 
363.0 
VARIABLES 
6 
ITEM MEANS MEAN MINIMUM MAXIMUM RANGE MAX/MIN VARIANCE 
2.8880 2.5647 3.3361 .7713 1.3008 .0845 
RELIABILITY COEFFICIENTS 6 ITEMS 
ALPHA = 3.6747 STANDARDIZED ITEM ALPHA = . 6 742 
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TABLE XXXIX 
RELIABILI1Y ANALYSIS - SCALE (THREE) 
MEAN SID DEV CASES 
ITEM 3 3.6860 1.3402 363.0 
ITEM 9 2.8815 1.3865 363.0 
ITEM 15 3. 1956 1.2865 363.0 
ITEM 16 1. 7052 1.2933 363.0 
ITEM 22 2.5702 1. 1260 363.0 
ITEM 26 3. 1488 1.3044 363.0 
ITEM 34 2.3774 1.3799 363.0 
ITEM 37 2.8017 1.2828 363.0 
N = 363.0 
STATISTICS FOR MEAN VARIANCE SID DEV VARIABLES 
SCALE 22.3664 29.6251 5.4429 8 
ITEM MEANS MEAN MINIMUM MAXIMUM RANGE MAX/MIN VARIANCE 
. 2.7958 1.7052 3.6860 1.9807 2.1616 .3571 
RELIABILI1Y COEFFICIENTS 8 ITEMS 
ALPHA = .6195 STANDARDIZED ITEM ALPHA = .6255 
ITEM 8 
ITEM 12 
TABLE XXXX 
RELIABILITY ANALYSIS-SCALE (FOUR) 
MEAN STD DEV CASES 
3.7410 1.0869 363.0 
3.6667 1.2838 363.0 
ITEM 28 . 3.6501 .9021 363.0 
ITEM 31 3.8292 1.0238 363.0 
ITEM 32 3.3196 .9846 363.0 
ITEM 38 3.5289 1.0089 363.0 
N = 363.0 
STATISTICS FOR MEAN VARIANCE STD DEV VARIABLES 
SCALE 21.7355 14.6315 3.8251 6 
ITEM MEANS MEAN MINIMUM MAXIMUM RANGE MAX/MIN VARIANCE 
3.6226 3.3196 3.8292 .5096 1.1535 .0320 
RELIABILITY COEFFICIENTS 6 ITEMS 
ALPHA = .6523 STANDARDIZED ITEM ALPHA = .6582 
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TABLE XXXXI 
RELIABILITY ANALYSIS-SCALE (FIVE) 
MEAN STD DEV CASES 
ITEM 1 3.1240 1.2116 363.0 
ITEM 10 3. 1093 1.3755 363.0 
ITEM 17 3.2617 1.2417 363.0 
ITEM 23 2.8044 1.2204 363.0 
ITEM 40 3.5565 .9513 363.0 
N = 363.0 
STATISTICS FOR MEAN VARIANCE STD DEV VARIABLES 
ITEM MEANS MEAN MINIMUM MAXIMUM RANGE MAX/MIN VARIANCE 
3.1532 2.8044 3.5565 .7521 1.2682 .0787 
RELIABILITY COEFFICIENTS 5 ITEMS 
ALPHA = . 6869 STANDARDIZED ITEM ALPHA = .6855 
TABLE XXXXII 
RELIABILITY ANALYSIS - SCALE (SIX) 
MEAN SID DEV 
ITEM 42 3.0992 1.0930 
ITEM 44 3.7548 .9622 
ITEM 47 2.7190 1.2585 
ITEM 48 3. 1873 1. 1977 
ITEM 49 3.0799 1.2311 
ITEM 50 2.4628 1.2704 
N = 363.0 
STATISTICS FOR MEAN VARIANCE SID DEV 
SCALE 18.3030 10.6483 3.2632 
CASES 
363.0 
363.0 
363.0 
363.0 
363.0 
363.0 
VARIABLES 
6 
ITEM MEANS MEAN MIMIMUM MAXIMUM RANGE MAX/MIN VARIANCE 
3.0505 2.4628 3.7548 1.2920 1.5246 .1947 
RELIABILITY COEFFICIENTS 6 ITEMS 
ALPHA = 7 . 2682 STANDARDIZED ITEM ALPHA = • 2823 
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TABLE XXXXIII 
RELIABILITY ANALYSIS-SCALE (SEVEN) 
MEAN SW DEV CASES 
ITEM 1 3.1240 1.2116 363.0 
ITEM 13 3.6942 1.0206 363.0 
ITEM 19 2.0413 1.2771 363.0 
ITEM 20 3.4463 1.0322 363.0 
ITEM 41 3. 1956 1. 1213 363.0 
ITEM 45 3.8953 .8311 363.0 
ITEM 46 3.7631 1.0077 363.0 
N = 363.0 
STATISTICS FOR MEAN VARIANCE SW DEV VARIABLES 
SCALE 23. 1598 13.8142 3. 7167 7 
ITEM MEANS MEAN MINIMUM MAXIMUM RANGE MAX/MIN VARIANCE 
3.3085 2.0413 3.8953 1.8540 1.9082 .3952 
RELIABILITY COEFFICIENTS 7 ITEMS 
ALPHA = .4767 STANDARDIZED ITEM ALPHA = .4874 
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TABLE XXXXIV 
REALIBILITY ANALYSIS TOTAL SCALE 
MEAN STD DEV CASES 
ITEM 1 3.1240 1.2116 363.0 
ITEM 2 3.6061 1.0599 363.0' 
ITEM 3 3.6860 1.3402 363.0 
ITEM 4 2.9201 1.4666 363.0 
ITEM 5 3.7741 1. 1485 363.0 
ITEM 6 3.5510 1.2189 363.0 
ITEM 7 3.8981 1.0658 363.0 
ITEM 8 3.7410 1.0869 363.0 
ITEM 9 2.8815 1.3865 363.0 
ITEM 10 3.0193 1.2755 363.0 
ITEM 11 3.6364 1.2077 363.0 
ITEM 12 3.6667 1.2838 363.0 
ITEM 13 3.6942 1.0206 363.0 
ITEM 14 3.3278 1. 1776 363.0 
ITEM 15 3.1956 1.2865 363.0 
ITEM 16 1. 7052 1.2933 363.0 
ITEM 17 3.2617 1.2417 363.0 
ITEM 18 3.4766 1.2015 363.0 
ITEM 19 2.0413 1.2771 363.0 
ITEM 20 3.4463 1.0322 363.0 
ITEM 21 3.4738 1.0360 363.0 
ITEM 22 2.5702 1.1260 363.0 
ITEM 23 2.8044 1.2204 363.0 
ITEM 24 3.2645 1. 1474 363.0 
ITEM 25 3.7796 1.0517 363.0 
ITEM 26 3.1488 1.3044 363.0 
ITEM 27 3.4959 1.0934 363.0 
ITEM 28 3.6501 .9021 363.0 
ITEM 29 3.3361 1.0232 363.0 
ITEM 30 2.5840 1. 1421 363.0 
ITEM 31 3.8292 1.0238 363.0 
ITEM 32 3.3196 .9846 363.0 
ITEM 33 2.5647 1.1649 363.0 
ITEM 34 2.3774 1.3799 363.0 
ITEM 35 3.0413 1.0673 363.0 
ITEM 36 3.5840 1.0850 363.0 
ITEM 37 2.8017 1.2828 363.0 
ITEM 38 3.5289 1.0089 363.0 
ITEM 39 2.8815 1.1024 363.0 
ITEM 40 3.5565 .9513 363.0 
ITEM 41 3. 1956 1.1213 363.0 
ITEM 42 3.0992 1.0930 363.0 
ITEM 43 4.0275 .9069 363.0 
ITEM 44 3. 7548 .9622 363.0 
ITEM 45 3.8953 .8311 363.0 
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MEAN STD DEV CASES 
ITEM 46 3.7631 1.0077 363.0 
ITEM 47 2.7190 1.2585 363.0 
ITEM 48 3.1873 1. 1977 363.0 , 
ITEM 49 3.0799 1.2311 363.0 
ITEM 50 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY. AND DISCUSSION 
'!he purpose of the present ~tudy was to detect differences between 
"safe" and "unsafe" workers and to ascertain similarities between factor 
structures of factor loadings in this study versus those in Zohar's 
Israeli 1980 study. 
'!he hypotheses tested in the present study were stated as follows: 
1. '!here is no significant difference between "safe" and "unsafe" 
workers. 
a. As defined by the item scale scores. 
b. As defined by all 50 items Zohar/Holmes Safety Climate 
Attitudinal Inventory, the evaluation instrument. 
2. '!here is no similarity between factor structures of factor 
loadings in American industries versus those in Israel. 
Hypothesis one, concerned with differences between "safe" and 
"unsafe" workers, was tested utilizing item scale scores. '!he results 
of the analysis indicated that there is an overall significant 
difference between the perception of "safe" and "unsafe" workers in four 
out of seven (subconstructs) scales tested. 'Ihe use of discriminant 
analysis aided in determining seven scales (subcons~ructs) that are 
associated with the safeness/unsafeness variables. Significant 
differences between group means and standard deviations of the scale 
scores indicated differences in worker perceptions of management 
attitudes toward safety; perceived level of risk in the workplace; the 
perceived importance of safety training programs and the perceived 
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status of the safety officer. Since the safety officer is part of the 
managem~nt team, the employee perceptions of Scale 1 (Management) and 
Scale 5 (Safety Officer) were highly correlated. This finding was to be 
expected. 
Utilizing the Safety Climate Questionnaire containing Zohar's 
original 40 items, hypothesis two was tested. 1his resulted in 
significant differences between factor structures of factor loadings in 
this study versus Zohar's Israeli study. [\'bst of ·these differences can 
be attributed to cultural differences between the two countries 
including a strong influence of labor unions in American industries 
causing an apparent split between labor and management on basis safety 
issues. These differences are reflected in this present study. 
Reference was made to differences between Israeli and American 
labor organizations in Chapter 4. The Hestardruth, the major Israeli 
labor organization, covering 70 percent of all blue collar workers, 
provides a wide range of benefits for Israeli employees. An important 
assunption was that differences between Israeli and American labor 
unions accounted for many of the cultural variances referred to in this 
study. The foregoing is a SUIIIlary of the major cultural patterns 
created by U.S./Israeli labor union differences. 
1. 1he fact that 70 percent of the Israeli workers enjoy job 
security, comparable "to tenure", following one year of on the 
job experience, apparently causes the Israeli worker to 
perceive organizational safety climate differently from that of 
his/her U.S. counterpart. For example, Israeli workers 
perceived the value of safety training programs as being the 
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most important dimension in the work environment. In contrast 
U.S. workers rated ''management attitude toward safety" as the 
nunber one dimension. 
'Illis finding has sane significant implications. 'Ille fact that the 
Israeli worker appears to have more job security, he/she perceives job 
safety training as being of more value than "perceived management 
attitudes toward safety." In other words, the typical Israeli worker 
perceives safety training as a higher basic need than management 
attitude. Maslow's prepotency theory has sane implications here, the 
assunption that higher level needs of workers cannot emerge until lower 
ones such as job security have first been satisfied should be 
considered. Because of union protection and "tenure", the lower level 
need of job security has apparently been satisfied in the Israeli 
worker. 'Illis researcher theorizes that Maslow's theory of hunan 
behavior, on the basis of hierarchy of needs, can be directly related to 
analyzing and evaluating organizational safety climate. 
2. Other significant differences in Israeli worker percept~ons and 
those of U.S. workers were perceptions of the following 
dimensions: perceived affects of the safety officer; effects 
of safe conduct on social status and the perceived status of 
the safety camiittee. Israeli workers ranked these dimensions 
6, 7 and 8 respectively, in contrast, the U.S. workers ranked 
perceptions of the safety officer as dimension nunber 2; 
perceived effects of safe conduct on social dimension nunber 3 
and the status of the safety camiittee as nunber 8. 
It is theorized that the typical Israeli worker ranked 
such dimensions as perceived effects of the safety officer; 
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effects of safe conduct on social status and the status of the safety 
camiittee as having the least amount of weight based on perceptions of 
workers. Perceptions are influenced by the worker's value system, 
personality traits and cultural differences. 'llle major differences in 
U.S. and Israeli worker rankings are assuned to be the result of the 
respective labor organizational climates in the two countries. In 
Israel, the Hestardruth provides much job security for the blue collar 
worker; excellent health benefits,; union protection and tenure; plus an 
excellent worker's compensation program in the event of an accident. 
Based on these facts, most of the worker's lower level needs (Maslow) 
have been satisfied. Higher level needs such as belongingness needs, 
self-esteem and self-actualization can be satisfied only after basic 
physiologic and safety needs have been satisfied. Maslow construes the 
. worker not as being pushed by drives; instead. the worker is pulled by 
the need to be fulfilled. 'llle Israeli worker. no doubt, is influenced 
differently by his/her labor union organization then his/her counterpart 
in the U.S. 
In contrast to Zohar's research results, .American workers perceive 
management, including the organizations chief executive officer, safety 
officer and/or superviser, as important dimensions or components of an 
industrial organization's safety climate. Based on the princ:dpal 
component analysis and factor structure in this present study. the major 
dimension rated high by U.S. worker was their perception of ''management 
attitudes toward safety." 'lllis perception was evident in worker ratings 
of management personnel generally, (e.g., supervisor, safety officer. 
safety committee). 'llle most important component of safety was 
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management; those individuals who were perceived to have the major 
responsibility for safety. The U.S. worker ranked ''management 
attitudes" as number 1; perceived status of the safety officer was rated 
number 2 and the perceived effects of safe conduct on social status was 
rated as dimension nunber 3. 
It is sanewhat difficult to evaluate the U.S. worker's perceptions 
based on Maslow's scheme of satisfaction or striving for higher needs. 
The individual worker needs to be sufficiently gratified by his/her 
basic needs (e.g., physiologic, safety needs, love needs, etc.). 
W:>rkers need to utilize their capabilities and they need to be motivated 
by basic values, (e.g., moral, ethical. religious aesthetic) for which 
they strive, and for the loyali ty to the organization for which they 
work. It is evident that Israeli and U.S. workers, in this study, 
expressed their feelings in totally different ways. Cultural 
differences and the level of effect that labor organizational practices 
had on U.S. worker's perceptions toward management were high! ighted in 
this study. In contrast, the Isreali workers rated safety training. 
effects of safe conduct on promotion and perceived levels of risk in the 
work place or having the greatest effect on safety climate. Both U.S. 
and Israeli workers rated management attitude high. (U.S. (1); Israeli. 
(2). This researcher assumes that the differences between personal 
perceptions of U.S. and Israeli workers were conditioned much by labor 
organizational climate (e.g., high security vs. low security) which 
could affect employee perceptions of the work environment. 
A main focus of this study was directed to the psychological 
factors involved with safety; more specifically, with individuals' 
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perceptions of the environment around them. This concept, known as 
organizational climate, discussed in Chapters 1 & 2, can be useful in 
evaluating the success of ongoing programs and evaluation for future 
programing discussed later in this chapter. The approaeh used in the 
present study is particularly useful in occupational health and safety 
because of the effect that perceived worker attitudes have on safe 
performance. 
Several previous studies have evaluated organizational climate and 
compared the results with results of safety inspections. They concluded 
overwhelmingly, that companies in which the organizational climate was 
favorable toward safety, ultimately were the companies that also had the 
best safety programs. Since climate is a personal perception and it 
affects attitude, it can be instrumental in fashioning the individual's 
safety behavior. 
Organizational climate may affect behavior by; defining the stimuli 
which confront the individual, placing constraints on the freedan of 
choice of behavior, and/or rewarding and punishing behavior. (Forehand 
& Gilmer, 1964). Perceptions are influenced by abilities, values, and 
personality traits of the perceiver as well as his/her organizational 
roles. Values can be considered to be canmon to all people regardless 
of race, culture, nationality, or religion. 
Applying the concept of organizational climate to industry helps to 
evaluate employees' perception of the importance that the company places 
on safe practices. The mean of individual perceptions reflects the 
safety climate of the given company. The information should include 
perceptions of management's attitudes toward safety and their 
perceptions of the relevance of safety in the general production 
process. Companies with high safety climate scores and successful 
safety programs tend to have strong management c0111Tiitment to safety 
(Zohar, 1980) 1his is supported by the findings of this study. 
Implications For Industry 
In Chapter IV Table XXXI there is a list of 12 discriminating 
inventory items which are purported to have significantly high 
. 
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predictibility values. 1hus 12 items are listed in Scales 1, 3. 4. 5. 
and 7. 1here are some definite applications here for industrial 
organizations which are presented in the foregoing analysis which 
proposes the develoµnent of employee classification instrument. 
Scale one, management attitude, contained four of the items of high 
predictability. 1he four items are I1 (Safety Training A W::>rthy 
Investment), I21 (Manager Views Safety Regulations Seriously), I27 
(Manager C.Ontrols Hazards) and I43 (Important for supervisor to point 
out Hazards). 
Differences can be noted in the Scale loadings. I27 had the 
highest scale loading of • 75 followed by I21 with a Scale loading of 
.64; I43 had a loading of .59 and I7 with a Scale1 loading of ~35. Item 
21 correlated with a total of eight items in Sc~ 1, 6 and 7; whereas, 
I21 correlated with a total of eight items in Scales 1, 6 and 7; 
followed by I27 which correlated with five items in Scales 1, 5 and 6. 
Item 7 correlated with only two items in Scale 5-3(Appendix V). Item 43 
did not covary with any other scale item with correlations above .30. 
1he implications for industrial application of the four items of 
predictability under scale one are especially pranising when analyzing 
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the inventory items (I7 , 121 , 127 , 143 ) of high predictability. 
Furthermore, intercorrelation was observed with a total of 1? other inventory 
items contained in Scales 1, 5, 6 and 7. Scale 1 had the highest 
reliability coefficient alpha of .9649 plus the most number of items of 
predictability (See Table XXXVIII). 
Scale 3 contained two items of predictability; r15 (This factory is 
dangerous) and I34 (Chance of accident large). r15 and I 34 
intercorrelated with items 22 and 26, both of which loaded on Scale 3. 
Scale 4 (Safety Training) contained only one item of 
predictability. This inventory item was labelled r38 (Dangerous 
Situation Reported). It covaried with r40 which loaded on Scale 5. 
Scale 7 included two discriminating items; r19 (Status-Belonging to 
Safety Conmittee) and 145 (Employees Self Evaluation Important). <he of 
the major differences between Scale 7 and Scales 1, 3, 4, and 5 is that 
the Scale 7 item intercorrelation did not include any items having 
correlation levels above .30. A minimum factor loading level of .30 was 
established early in the study and it was used throughout the research 
as a minimum criterion for practical consideration. 
Following an analysis of the 12 items of high predictability and 
items of intercorrelation, an existing new test instrument is proposed. 
Chee constructed, it could be used by organizations to discriminate and 
predict employee behavior as being "safe" or "unsafe". In addition, to 
the 12 items of predictability, a total of 12 other inventory items with 
correlations of more than .30 could be included in the proposed test 
instrument for a total of 24 items. These predictability items could 
then be used for the purposes of categorizing employees into Group 1 
(safe) or into Group 2 (lhsafe) classifications. 
1he proposed employee classification instrument could include the 
following items: 
SCALE 
PREDICTABILI'IY ITEM LOADING SCALE NO. CORRELATIVE ITEMS 
I Training i.brthy .35 1 2 
7 Invesbnent 
I21 Manager views, 
Safety Regs 
.64 1 8 
Seriously 
Iz7 Manager Controls • 75 1 5 
Hazards 
143 Importance for .59 1 0 
Supervisor to 
Point out Hazards 
I34 Chance of Accident . 74 3 1 
Large 
I15 1his Factory 3 1 
Dangerous 
I38 Dangerous Situation .42 4 1 
Reported 
It Safety· c.aimittee .68 5 2 
Warning Affects 
Behavior 
I10 Safety Officer .51 5 8 
Influence Great 
I40 Safety Officer .42 5 1 
Issues Safety 
Regulation-
Employees behave 
Accordingly 
11~ Status Belonging .65 7 0 
to Safety Cannittee 
I45 Employees Self .65 7 0 
Evaluation Important 
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122. 
CORRELATIVE ITEMS 
High/Predictability 
CORRELATION ITEMS ITEM LOADING SCALE PREDICTABILITY 
I17 Safety O::xmlittee .• 37 1' 5 I10' I17 Positive Effect 
Iz4 Safety Issues .49 1, 5 I1 ' I10 High Priority 
I25 Accident Affects .35 1 110 Reputation 
136 Management .Adopts .46 1, 5 I1 
' 
110 ' 117 New Ideas 
141 W:>rkers Conduct .35 1 121 Improves Social 
Status 
I42 Supervisor's .30 1 I21 Guidance over 
Enforcement 
U.7 Atroosphere free .30 1 127 Of Threat 
148 Supervisor's .33 1 ' 6 127' I43 Understanding 
I.49 Supervisor's .30 1, 6 127' 143 Humanistic 
I4z Matter ot Time .43 3 115 Before Accident 
126 Job Safety Problems .43 3 134 Serious 
111 MGMT/Increase .43 5 110 $ for Safety 
Based on discriminate analysis which resulted in a high Alpha 
():)efficient (reliability estimate), the construction of a test 
instrument utilizing the items of high predictability and 
intercorrelative items is recamJended. The instrument could be 
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administered to employees for classification purposes. It could also be 
used to classify employees into "safe" or "unsafe" categories with a 
fairly high predictability value for group membership. 
The proposed employee classification instrument could be one of the 
most important outcanes of this study. Further study of the test 
instrument is recanmended to determine the full implications of such an 
. 
evaluation instrument to industry. 
Recanmendations for Additional Research 
1. The present study was 1 imi ted to data of 425 workers f ran 11 
industrial organizations located in Illinois and Wisconsin. 
Since the total sample was selected fran industries located in 
the midwest, the results of the study may not be generalizable 
to industries located in other sections of the United States. 
This study should be replicated in other types of industries 
such as mining, construction, and agriculture where accident 
experience is high. Furthermore, this study should be 
conducted in other parts of the U.S. for purposes of 
determining external validity. 
2. The fact that a study by Fleischman in 1953 found that workers 
adapt, not as they have been taught, but in a style to fit 
their work climate (the way in which their supervisor behaved) 
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suggest that this may be a major area of concern when a low 
. organizational climate is diagnosed. By manipulating cues in a 
simulated work place one can create climates designed to 
produce behaviors such as high levels of power, affiliation, 
and achievement motivation (Litwin & Stringer, 1968). 'Illis may 
be accomplished by strengthening management commitment to 
safety. TI-tere are several ways in which to do this. Give 
safety matters high priority in safety meetings and in 
production scheduling (e.g., have management personnel at the 
V.P. level report on safety problems and proposed solutions at 
safety meetings). Support of the conviction that safety is an 
integral part of the production system and that accidents are 
signs of design faults in the system. Top Management support 
of decision and safety programs by safety supervisors is 
proposed. Place high emphasis on safety training with strong 
communication lines and frequent inspections by both personnel 
and management. PrOIOOte general environmental control and good 
housekeeping. Stabilize the work force with a lower turnover 
and increase in the average age of employees, and finally 
provide guidance and counseling to pr0100te safety. TI-tis could 
be a major area of further research by changing or creating 
climates to produce behaviors under simulated conditions. 
Future research could be conducted on a before and after basis 
in selected industries with low organizational safety climates. 
TI-le results of simulating over in these industries could then 
be studied. 
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3. In the present study, mostly union workers were included. 
Further research could be accomplished comparing an equal 
number of non-union and union workers on their perceptions 
toward the environment around them. Canparisons could then be 
made between union and non-union worker perceptions of selected 
"safe" and "unsafe" environmental conditions. 
4. Future research could be focused on evaluating the proposed 
employee classification test instrument designed to 
discriminate between a safe employee versus an unsafe one. 'Ihe 
results of the instrlllllent could be cued to assign an employee 
to the most appropriate group and or job task based on his/her 
safety or unsafe classification. It could also assist 
companies in employee selection, hiring, and placement. 'Ihe 
practical aspects such an instrument could be studied in 
selected industries prior to final publication and 
dissemination. 
5. Conduct a similar study to this present one on a qualitative 
basis. Select a team of investigators who would spend time 
within an industry to collect demographic and qualitative data 
by interviewing workers and reading questionnaire items to 
randomly selected employees. 'Ihe demographic data collected by 
interviewing of workers should provide more detailed and 
comprehensive data to be used for in-depth the analysis of 
"safe" and "unsafe" workers. Comparisons and contrasts could 
be made with results of the present study based on the outcomes 
of the qualitative study. 
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Sunmary 
Since its infancy, safety management has been typically concerned 
with things such as, engineering, physical stress, chemical stress, and 
others. ~re recently, however, the focus has been switched to the 
psychological factors involved with safety, more specifically, with 
individuals' perceptions of the environment around them. This concept, 
known as organizational climate, can be useful in a variety of ways, 
including evaluating the success of ongoing programs as well as any 
need for future programs. This approach is particularly useful in 
safety because of the great effect that attitudes have been shown to 
have on safe performance. 
The concept of organizational climate when applied to safety can be 
a valuable tool for evaluation of current safety programs as well as 
determining needs for changes in the future. 
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APPENDIX I 
Performance Sites 
Organization SIC Type Contact person # of Bnployees 
Schneider Transportation 7219 M:>tor Transportation Thanas A. Titzkowski 1700 Drivers 
Inc. 
P.O. Box 2298 
Green Bay, WI 54306 
Safety-Kleen Corporation Industrial Sandra Latuf zek 380 
777 Big Timber Road Cleaning 
Elgin, IL 60120 Products 
(697-8460-Sandy) & Services 
.Ambrosia Uiocolate Co. 2066 Food Processing Al Zipperer 350 
1133 N. 5th St. Plant (Uiocolate 
Mi 1 waukee, WI 53203 Products) 
City of Kenosha 9111 City Government Kenneth Horner 687 
625 52nd St. 9199 (Safety Program) 
Kenosha, WI 53140 
Signod Corporation 3499 Packaging System Robert Peterson 3900 
3600 W. Lake Avenue (Steel & Plastic 
Glenview, IL 60025 Strapping, Hand 
Tools & Machines) 
.American Br ass- 33 Copper & Copper Thanas Rugg 650 
Arco Metals Alloyed Brass 
1420 63rd St. Production 
Kenosha, WI 43140 
...... 
VJ 
w 
Perfonnance Sites (cont.) 
Organization SIC Type C.Ontact Person # of Employees 
1be Larsen C.O. 2030 Canning Company Mike Ma 1 lman 450 
Green bay, WI & food Processing 
The Larsen C.O. 1030 Canning Company John Hein 450 
Jones AvemJe & Food Processing Safety Manager 
Fort Atkinson, WI 
53538 
Mercury Marine 3519 Foundry, Dir cast Tan·Baumgartner 5500 
1939 Pioneer Road Heavy Machinery Safety & Health 
Fond du Lac, WI & Assembly Manager 
54935 
Milwaukee Metro- 9111 Waste Water Ms. Judy Grzegorski 675 
politan Sewerage 9199 Treatment 
District 
735 Water Street 
Mi 1 waukee, WI 53202 
Weil er & C.O. 3550 Fabrication of Qxmi- Rick Hendrickson 100 
214 S. 2nd Street mercial Meat Grinders Superintendent of 
Whitewater, WI 53190 and Mixers Manufacturing 
APPENDIX II 
ZOHAR/HOLMES SAFETY CLIMATE ATII1UDE 
INVENTORY INSTRUCTIONS 
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'Ihis inventory is designed to find out what you think about job 
safety and other related issues in your workplace. Please describe the 
current situation and DO NOT describe what you think it ought to be. 
All you need to do is indicate how much you agree or disagree with each 
questionnaire item. In other words, how much it is true in your case. 
In order to mark your response, all you have to do is circle the 
appropriate number. See the following example: 
highly not highly not 
disagree disagree sure agree agree relevant 
In this canpany 
every worker can 
do his job the 
way he thinks it 
ought to be done. 
1 2 3 4 5 0 
You can mark the category title ''not relevant" when the.sentence 
refers to things which do not exist at your workplace. 
'Ihis inventory is absolutely anonymous and there is no way to 
identify you personally. We want you, therefore, to be canpletely 
honest and respond as you really think and feel. If for sane reason you 
wish to withdraw fran this study, you may do so at any time without any 
negative consequence. 
Thank you very much for your cooperation. 
APPENDIX III 
1HE ZOHAR/HOu-tES SAFETY CLIMATE ATII1UDE INVENTORY 
C.ornpany Name: 
Questionnaire No.: 
highly not highly not 
disagree disagree sure agree agree relevant 
1. When a member 
of the safety 
CCXTITlittee 
approaches a 
worker and 
warns him, it 
really affects 
his behavior. 1 2 3 4 5 0 
2. i-brkers who 
violate safety 
regulations 
aggravate their 
fellow workers 
even when no 
harm has 
resulted. 1 2 3 4 5 0 
3. The risk level 
of my job con-
cerns me quite 
a bit. 1 2 3 4 5 0 
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4. W::>rkers who 
behave safely 
have a higher 
chance for pro-
motion than 
those who don't. 1 2 3 4 5 0 
5. I usually inform 
my supervisor 
about safety 
issues in this 
plant. 1 2 3 4 5 0 
6. Our general manager 
is well informed 
about safety issues 
in this plant. 1 2 3 4 5 0 
7. 'Ille investment of 
money and effort in 
safety training pro-
grams is a worthy 
investment because 
it improves workers' 
performance on the 
job. 1 2 3 4 5 0 
8. 'Ille best guys in 
our department care 
about safety and 
140 
they want other 
workers to behave 
according to the 
regulations. 1 2 3 4 5 0 
9. Work under a premium 
system has nothing 
to do with accidents. 
There are simply safe 
workers and unsafe 
ones. 1 2 3 4 5 0 
10. The safety officer 
has much influence 
on what's happening 
in our factory. 1 2 3 4 5 0 
11. Plant management in 
this factory is 
willing to invest 
money and effort to 
improve the safety 
level in here. 1 2 3 4 5 0 
12. My safety training 
really helps me both 
in my work and at 
hane. 1 2 3 4 5 0 
13. Reckless behavior 
results in a negative 
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evaluation of super-
visors towards that 
worker. 1 2 3 4 5 0 
14. Our management is 
well informed about 
safety problems 
and it quickly 
acts to correct 
them. 1 2 3 4 5 0 
15. My chance for 
being involved 
in an accident is 
quite large. 1 2 3 4 5 0 
16. Because I am working 
under a premium 
system I do things 
so fast that I 
have no time 
to care for my 
safety. 1 2 3 4 5 0 
17. The safety camJittee 
in camJittee in our 
plant has a very 
positive effect on 
what is happening 
here. 1 2 3 4 5 0 
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18. Managers in this 
factory really care 
and try to reduce 
risk levels as much 
as possible. 1 2 3 4 5 0 
19. I would like to 
become a member 
of our plant safety 
camiittee because 
it would give me 
more status. 1 2 3 4 5 0 
20. When a worker 
violates safety 
regulations it has 
an adverse effect 
on his supervisor's 
evaluation of him 
even when no harm 
was caused. 1 2 3 4 5 0 
21. Our managers view 
safety regulation 
violations very 
seriously even when 
they have resulted 
in no apparent 
damage. 1 2 3 4 5 0 
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22. I am sure it is 
only a matter of 
time for me to 
get involved in 
an accident. 1 2 3 4 5 0 
23. When the safety 
officer has a 
' 
negative opinion 
. of saneone, it 
affects his super-
visor's 
evaluation. 1 2 3 4 5 0 
24. I think safety 
issues are 
assigned high 
priority in 
management 
meetings. 1 2 3 4 5 0 
25. The efforts 
invested in 
organizing 
safety training 
programs really 
pay back to the 
canpany. 1 2 3 4 5 0 
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26. The safety pro-
blems in my job 
are very serious. 1 2 3 4 5 0 
27. When a manager 
realizes that a 
hazardous situation 
has been found, 
he irrmediately 
attempts to put 
it under control. 1 2 3 4 5 0 
28. Workers work safely 
try to emphasize it 
and make sure others 
appreciate it. 1 2 3 4 5 0 
29. Workers who take 
safety training 
courses are less 
involved in acci-
dents than those 
who don't. 1 2 3 4 5 0 
30. Che of the main 
factors affecting 
workers' evaluation 
for promotion is 
whether they were 
involved in an 
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accidents. 1 2 3 4 5 0 
31. Workers who use 
personal protective 
equipnent are not 
considered to be 
cowards but rather 
good and tidy 
workers. 1 2 3 4 5 0 
32. Department managers 
usually remember who 
were involved in 
an accident and take 
it into con-
sideration. 1 2 3 4 5 0 
33. Workers who take 
safety training 
· courses have a 
better chance for 
promotion than 
those who don't. 1 2 3 4 5 0 
34. U::mpared to other 
factories, I think 
this one is 
.rather dangerous. 1 2 3 4 5 0 
35. Being involved in 
an accident has 
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an adverse effect 
on the worker's 
reputation. 1 2 3 4 5 0 
36. Plant management 
in this factory 
is always willing 
to adopt new ideas 
for improving the 
safety level. 1 2 3 4 5 0 
37. Workers who don't 
work under a premium 
system can work 
more carefully. 1 2 3 4 5 0 
38. When a worker 
confronts a danger-
ous situations in 
his work environment 
he reports it to the 
safety officer. l 2 3 4 5 0 
39. Workers who take 
safety training 
courses are doing 
a better job than 
those who don't. 1 2 3 4 5 0 
40. When the safety 
officer issues 
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a safety regula-
tion, we take it 
into consideration 
and behave 
accordingly. 1 2 3 4 5 0 
41. I feel that a 
worker's safe conduct 
will improve his/her 
social status among 
other employees • 1 2 3 4 5 0 
. 
42. It is my opinion 
that supervisor 
guidance in safe 
practices is more 
important than the 
enforcement of 
safety rules. 1 2 3 4 5 0 
43. It is important 
for the safety 
supervisor to 
point out hazards 
which could cause 
painful injury. 1 2 3 4 5 0 
44. It is my feeling 
that counseling 
by supervisors 
148 
is more effective 
than punishment or 
reprimand when it 
concerns safety 
motives. 1 2 3 4 5 0 
45. Employees need 
to be encouraged 
to evaluate themselves 
in relation to 
efficiency, produc-
tivity and safety 
perhaps even more 
than they need 
evaluation by their 
supervisors. 1 2 3 4 5 0 
46. Understanding and 
coping with the 
feelings of others 
is just as impor-
tant as learning 
facts, safety rules 
and operational 
skills. 1 2 3 4 5 0 
47. The working atrnos-
phere in my company 
is free of threat, 
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pressure and 
excessive com-
petition. 1 2 3 4 5 0 
48. Our supervisors 
are normally under~ 
standing and they 
help to foster an 
atmosphere that is 
genuine, open and 
sincere. 1 2 3 4 5 0 
49. My supervisors are 
understanding and 
I feel they can put 
themselves in the 
place of workers 
such as myself. 1 2 3 4 5 0 
50. t-bst of the time 
I am made to feel 
like a lower class 
citizen by my 
supervisor. 1 2 3 4 5 0 
51. As an employee, I 
consider myself 
to be self directive 
and assertive, 
wanting to help my 
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fellow workers and 
I want to make a 
contribution to 
the company. 1 2 3 4 s 0 
S2. There is a need for 
a program to change 
safety behavior and 
attitudes in our 
organization 
starting with 
top management. 1 2 3 4 s 0 
S3. To merely point out 
the accidents cost 
the canpany money 
does not motivate 
me or my fellow 
workers to work 
safely. 1 2 3 4 s 0 
S4. The main reason 
why I work safely 
at all times is 
that my family 
would suffer if I 
were injured. 1 2 3 4 s 0 
SS. Please fill in the following demographic data (if you feel that any of 
these data may identify you and you wish to remain anaymous, leave it 
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blank): 
a. Department: 
b. Job Title: 
c. Age: 
d. Sex: Male Female 
e. Marital status: Single Married 
f. No. of years in this ccmpany: 
g. No. of years in your present job: 
56. In your opinion, what is the most important factor affecting the safety 
level of this plant? 
57. lb you have any other conrnents which you wish to make, either about this 
questionnnaire or any other safety-related issues? Please use the back 
of this page. 
Thank you! 
APPENDIX IV 
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Discriminant Analysis on Groups Defined by No 
Accident Status (Group 1) and Accident Status (Group 2) 
Mean and Standard Deviation of 
Inventory Item 
x SD 
ITEM 1 1-3.13 1-1.14 
2-3.11 2-1.27 
Total 3.12 Total 1.20 
ITEM 2 1-3.54 1-1.05 
2-3.73 2-1.01 
Total 3.63 Total 
ITEM 3 1-3.69 1-1.34 
2-3.70 2-1. 33 
Total 2.70 Total 1.33 
ITEM 4 1-2.79 1-1.43 
2-3.03 2-1.49 
Total 2.90 Total 1.46 
ITEM 5 1-3.74 1-1.18 
2-3.87 2-1.07 
Total 3.80 Total 1.13 
ITEM 6 1-3.47 1-1. 21 
2-3.61 2-1. 23 
Total 3.54 Total 1.22 
ITEM 7 1-3.78 1-1.09 
2-4. 07 2-0.96 
Total 3.91 Total 1.04 
ITEM 8 1-3.69 1-1.01 
2-3.82 2-1.13 
Total, 1.07 
ITEM 9 1-2. 91 1-1.35 
2-2. 79 2-1.42 
Total 2.85 Total 1.38 
ITm 10 1-2.80 1-1.34 
2-3.20 2-1.38 
Total 2.99 Total 1.37 
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ITEM 11 1-3.50 1-1.23 
2-3. 79 2-1.16 
Total 3.64 Total 1.20 
ITEM 12 1-3.55 1-1.31 
2-3. 79 2-1.25 
Total 3.67 Total 1.28 
ITEM 13 1-3.68 1-0.95 
2-3.76 2-1.16 
Total 3.64 Total 1.20 
ITEM 14 1-3.18 1-1.16 
2-3.53 2-1.14 
Total 3.34 Total 1.17 
lTEM 15 1-3.32 1-1.23 
2-3.00 2-1.34 
Total 3.17 Total 1.29 
ITEM 16 1-1. 71 1-1.20 
2-1.53 2-1.20 
Total 1.63 Total 1.25 
ITEM 17 1-3 .11 1-1.20 
2-3.41 2-1.26 
Total 3.25 Total 1.23 
ITEM 18 1-3.36 1-1.19 
2-3. 65 2-1.16 
Total 3.49 Total 1.18 
ITEM 19 1-2·.04 1-1.17 
2-1.84 2-1. 26 
Total 1. 95 Total 1.21 
ITEM 20 1-3.35 1-1.05 
2-3.53 2-0.94 
Total 3.44 Total 1.00 
lTEM 21 1-3.30 1-1.08 
2-3.67 2-0.91 
Total 3.47 Total 1.02 
!'.!EM 22 1-2.69 1-1.13 
2-2.36 2-1.07 
Total 2.53 Total 1.11 
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ITFM 23 1-2.82 1-1.20 
2-2.73 2-1.24 
Total 2.78 Total 1.22 
ITFM 24 1-3.15 1-1.20 
2-3.40 2-1.04 
Total 3.27 Total 1.13 
ITFM 25 1-3.73 1-1.09 
2-3.90 2-0.97 
Total 3.81 Total 1.04 
ITFM 26 1-3.28 1-1.23 
2-3.00 2-1. 36 
Total 3.14 Total 1.30 
ITEM 27 1-3.42 1-1.09 
2-3.61 2-f .08 
Total 3.51 Total 1.09 
ITEM 28 1-3.64 1-0. 94 
2-3.67 2-0 .82 
Total 3.65 Total 0.88 
ITFM 29 1-3.28 1-1.07 
2-3.35 2-0.94 
Total 3.32 Total 1.01 
ITEM 30 1-2.54 1-1.20 
2-2.60 2-1.05 
Total 2.57 Total 1.13 
ITEM 31 1-3.83 1-1.00 
2-3.87 2-1.04 
Total 3.85 Total 1. 02 
ITEM 32 1-3.33 1-0.94 
2-3.34 2-1.00 
Total 3.33 Total 0.97 
ITFM 33 1-2.50 1-1.13 
2-2.57 2-1.19 
Total 2.53 Total 1.16 
!TFM 34 1-2.56 1-1.36 
2-2.10 2-1.35 
Total 2. 35· Total 1.37 
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ITEM 35 1-3.04 1-1.04 
2-3.03 2-1.07 
Total 3.03 Total 1.05 
ITEM 36 1-3.54 1-1.09 
2-3.68 2-1.06 
Total 3.61 Total 1.08 
ITEM 37 1-2.81 1-1.23 
2-2. 76 2-1. 32 
Total 2.78 Total 1.27 
ITEM 38 1-3.46 1-0. 99 
2-3.64 2-0 .94 
Total 3.54 Total 0.97 
ITEM 39 1-2.89 1-1.11 
2-2.89 2-1.03 
Total 2.89 Total 1.07 
ITEM 40 1-3.53 1-0.96 
2-3.60 2-0.93 
Total 3.57 Total 0.95 
ITEM 41 1-3.15 1-1.16 
2-3.25 2-1.06 
Total 3.20 Total 1.11 
ITEM 42 1-3.10 1-1.08 
2-3.05 2-1.12 
Total 3.08 Total 1.10 
ITEM 43 1-4 .09 1-0.84 
2-4 .04 2-0. 86 
Total 4.07 Total 
ITEM 44 1-3.79 1-0. 97 
2-3. 77 2-0.91 
Total 3.78 Total 0.94 
ITEM 45 1-3.84 1-0.86 
2-4 .oo 2-0. 74 
Total 3.92 Total 0.81 
ITEM 46 1-3. 77 1-1.07 
2-3.82 2-0.86 
Total 3.80 Total 0.98 
ITEM 47 
ITEM 48 
ITEM 49 
ITEM 50 
No Accident Group 1 
Accident Group 2 
1-2.57 
2-2.81 
Total 2.68 Total 
1-3.08 
2-3.30 
Total 3.18 Total 
1-3.00 
2-3.14 
Total 3.06 Total 
1-2.58 
2-2.28 
Total 2.44 Total 
Number 0£ Cases 
183 cases 
164 cases 
Total 347 cases 
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1-1.25 
2-1.25 
1.25 
1-1.21 
2-1.17 
1.20 
1-1.25 
2-1.22 
1.24 
1-1.28 
2.;.i. 21 
1.26 
APPENDIX V 
SCALE ITEM 
SCALE LABELS COMPOSITION 
Management I7 
Attitude 
121 
Iv 
HIGH PREDICTABILITY ITEM INI'ERCORRELATION 
SCALE 
LOADING 
.35 
.64 
• 75 
.59 
ITEM I.D. 
Training Worthy 
Investment 
Manager Views 
Safety Reg's 
Seriously 
Manager Controls 
Hazards 
Important for 
Supervisor to 
l'oint out 
liazards 
CORRELATIVE 
SCALE ITEMS CORRELATION 
5 I10 .30 
I17 • 37 
124 .49 
I25 .35 
1 I21 .48 
1 I36 .46 
7 I41 .35 
6 I42 • 30 
6 I48 .33 
6 I49 .JO 
I31 .36 
1 I36 .53 
5 I40 .32 
6 I47 .30 
6 I48 .45 
6 I49 .44 
(No Correlations More Than.30) 
CORRELATION 
!ID! IDENTIFIERS 
Safety Officer Influence Great 
Safety Committee Positive 
Safety Issues High Priority 
Accident Affects Reputation 
Manager Controls Hazards 
Management Adopts New Ideas 
Workers Conduct Improves Social Status 
Supervisor Guidance Over Enforcement 
Supervisor'~ Understanding 
Supervisor's Humanistic 
Workers Using PPE Not Cowards 
Management Adopts New Safety Ideas 
Saiety Officer Regulation Considered 
Atmosphere Free of Threat Etc~ 
Supervisor 13 Understanding 
Supervisor's llwuanistic 
....... 
Vl 
l.O 
SCALE 
3 
4 
5 
SCALE 
LABELS 
JlJ.sk 
Level 
Safety 
Training 
Status 
of 
Safety 
Officer 
Social 
Status 
HIGH PREDICTABILITY ITEM INI'ERCORREI.ATION (cont,.) 
ITEM SCALE 
COMPOSITION LOADING 
I15 • 74 
I34 
138 .42 
Il .68 
IlO 
I4o .42 
.65 
.65 
ITEM I.D. 
Chance of Acci-
dent Large 
This Factory 
Dangerous 
Dangerous 
Situation 
Reported 
Safety Committee 
Warning Affects 
Behavior 
Safety Officer 
Influence Great 
Safety Officer 
Issues Saf. Reg. 
Status Belonging 
to Safety 
Committee 
Employee's Self 
Jo.valuation 
Important 
CORRELATIVE 
SCALE ITEMS CORRELATION 
3 122 .49 
3 I26 .68 
5 I40 • 39 
5 I10 .30 
5 117 • 37 
1 I11 .43 
1 I21 .33 
l Iz4 .40 
1 I25 .37 
1 I27 • 34 
1 136 .37 
5 I40 .42 
I43 • 34 
(No Correlations More Than .30) 
(No Correlations More Than .30) 
CORRELATION 
ITEM IDF.NTIFIERS 
Matter of Time Before Accident 
Job Safety Problems Serious 
Safety Officer Regulation Considered 
Safety Officer Influence Great 
Safety Committee Positive Effect 
Management Willing to Invest $ 
Managers' View Safety Reg's Seriously 
Safety Issues High Priority 
Training Investment $ Pays Off 
Manager Control Hazards 
Management Adopts New Ideas 
Safety Officer Regulations Considered 
Important For Supervisor to Point 
out Hazards 
,_. 
"' 0 
APPENDIX VI 
FACTOR COMBINATIONS 
1. Item.4 loaded on both factors two (.61479) and factor seven 
(.33471). It was canbined with both factors and placed with 
factor 2 because of the higher loading on F2. 
2. Item 35 loaded on factor two (.35461) and factor six (.47576). 
In this case both loadings were fairly low resulting in a 
logical placement with Fz. 
3. Item 37 loaded on factor thirteen (.30169) and was placed 
logically under F3.• 
4. Item 8 loaded on factor four (.40825) and factor one (.34755). 
Even though both loadings were fairly low, item 8 was logically 
placed under F4. 
5. Item 12 loaded on factor four (.43687) and factor one (.44614). 
Again, logic was used in this case to place item 12 with F4. 
6. Item 10 loaded on factor five (.51915) and factor one (.50856). 
'Illere isn't much difference between the loadings, so the 
logical approach was used to place this item with Fs. 
7. Item 17 loaded on factor five (.58510) and factor one (.49227). 
Item 17 was canbined with factor five and seven, however, it 
was placed with F5 because of the higher loading. 
8. Item 23 loaded with factor five ( .49289) and factor two 
(.37005). It was canbined with factors five and one. Because 
of the significantly higher loading it was placed under F5 • 
9. Item 40 loaded with factor one (.42670). Logic was used to 
determine the outcome here. Item 40 was placed under Fs. 
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FACTOR COMBINATIONS (cont.) 
10. Item L~2 loaded with factor thirteen (. 70309). Therefore, 
factor 6 and factor 13 were combined to place item 42 logically 
under F6• 
11. Item 44 loaded with the combination of factor 13 and factor 6. 
The loading under factor 13 was .39855. Logically, it was 
placed under F6. 
12. Item 47 loaded with factor six (.41254) and factor two 
(.33321). Based on the higher loading, this item was placed 
under F6. 
13. Item 48 loaded with factor six (.56843) and factor one 
(.53490). The higher factor loading under factor 6 and logic 
were used in this case to place the item under F6. 
14. Item 49 loaded with factor six (.60483) and factor one 
(.50701). Based on the higher factor loading and logic this 
item was placed under F 6· 
15. Item 2 loaded factor seven (.37053) and factor six (.33545) and 
F 8 C.40034). Even though factor seven and Fs had the higher 
loadings, logic was used to'placed item 2 under F7. 
16. Item 41 loaded with factor eight (.69090). Here the 
combination of factors 7 and 8 were used to place item 41 under 
F7. 
17. Item 46 loaded with factor ten (.68637). Logic was used here 
to place their item under F7. 
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FACTOR COMBINATIONS (cont.) 
18. Item 45 was loaded with factor ten (.65160). L:>gic was used to 
place item 45 under F7. 
19. Item 19 was placed with factor seven. The loading on factor 
eleven was (-.65215) Factor 11 was combined with factor 7. 
Then, logic was used here for placement and F1. 
20. Item 9 was placed under F3 because of logic. It was combined 
with F11 where it had a loading of (. 75955) 
21. Item 43 had a loading of(.59271)on Fg. Factors 1 and 9 were 
combined and as a result of logic it was placed under F1 • 
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APPENDIX VII 
CCJ1PANY 
l. Schneider Trans., Inc 
2. Safety Kleen Corp 
3. Ambrosia-Chocolate 
4. City of Kenosha 
5. Signode Corp. 
6. .American Brass-ARCO Metals 
7. The Larsen Co 01 
8. The Larsen Co • .'!2 
CCMPANY HIGH/IDW RISK SELECTION 
CONDITION 
Trucking, Local & Long. Dist. 
Industrial-Transportation 
Food & Kindred Products 
Construction, cement, motor 
vehicles, lawn mowing etc 
Packaging, strapping, hand 
tools & machines (manuf actur-
ing) safety at corporate level 
Copper & Copper Alloyed Brass 
production-foundry work-blasf 
furnance & basic steel products 
Canning Co. & Food processing 
(Safety program at corporate 
level) 
HIGH RISK LOW RISK 
High Incidence 
Rate 10.41 per 
100 Full time 
employers 
Local & Suburban 
Transit 12. 74 
incidence rate per 
100 employees 
H1gh incidence rate 
9.46 per 100 Full 
time employees 
High incidence rate 
10 + per JOO full 
time employees 
High incidence rate 
11.35 per JOO worker 
Low incidence 
rate below 3.0 
per JOO 
employees 
Low incidence 
rate below 3.0 
per· JOO 
employees 
..... 
"' 
"' 
COMPANY 
'J. Hercury Marine 
10. Milwaukee Metro 
11. Weiler Corp. 
CCMP.ANY HIGH/I.ru RISK SELECTION (cont.) 
CONDITION 
Foundry, Dir Cast, Heavy 
Machinery & Assembly 
Engineering & Scientific 
Instruments-waste water 
meas. & control devices 
Fabrication of Comm. meat 
Grinders & Mixers (Fabricated 
metal products-special industry 
machinery) 
HIGH RISK 
High Incidence rate 
11.35 per 100 workers 
LOW RISK 
Incidence rate 
less than 3.0 
per 100 f/t 
employees. 
Incidence rate 
less than 7 
per 100 f/t 
workers 
APPENDIX VIII 
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Definitions of Certain Terms Used in 'Illis Study 
1. Accident is that occurrence in a sequence of events which usually 
produces unintended injury, death or property damage. 
2. Disabling injury is an injury causing death, permanent disability, 
or any degree of temporary total disability beyond the day of the 
accident. (Used in this study to determine accident group). 
3. High Risk canpany, determined by incidence rates of 10 + per 100 
full time employees; e.g., (conditions) transportation, 
construction, tunneling, foundry work, blast furnances, basic 
steel work, heavy machinery & assembly. 
4. Incidence rate, as defined by OSHA, is the number of injuries 
and/or illnesses or lost workdays per 100 full-time employees. 
5. Industrial Accident Prevention, a term which refers to how 
accidents can be controlled in an organization, ranging fran 
technical methods such as hazard recognition and control to the 
behavioral approaches through training and motivation. 
6. Safe Worker, any worker in their study who has worked a period of 
5 years without suffering a work related disabling injury 
accident. 
7. Unsafe Worker, is one who has experienced one or more work related 
accidents within the past 5 years. 'Ille accident would cause the 
worker to be unable to perform duties or activities on one or more 
full calendar days following the day of the injury. 
8. W:>rkers' Canpensensation insurance, is a canpensated accident case 
determined to be work related and for which canpensation was paid. 
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9. l.Dw Risk O:rnpany, detennined by incidence rates of 6 or less per 
100 employees, e.g., (CONDITIONS) packaging, manufacturing, food 
processing, engineering and scientific instruments, hand tools & 
machines. 
10. Temporary total disability is an injury which does not result in 
death or permanent disability, but which renders the injured 
person unable to perfonn regular duties or activities on one or 
more full calendar days after the day of the injury. (Used in 
this study). 
11. \.brk injuries (including occupational illness) are those which 
arise out of and in the course of gainful employment regardless of 
where the accident occurs. Excluded are work injuries to private 
household workers and injuries occurring in connection with fann 
chores which are classified as hane injuries. 
12. \.brkers are all persons gainfully employed, including owners, 
managers, other paid employees, the self-employed, and unpaid 
family workers, but excluding private household workers. 
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50 
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LOW RISK 
40 
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APPENDIX X 
. 
VARIABLE 
SCALE 1 
PA'IHO 
PA1HO 
PA'IHO 
PA1HO 
SCALE 2 
PA'IHO 
PA1HO 
PA'IHO 
PA1HO 
SCALE 3 
PA1HO 
PA'IHO 
PA'IHO 
PA1HO 
SCALE 4 
PA1HO 
PA1HO 
PA'IHO 
PA1HO 
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
HIGH RISK AND LCkl RISK INDUSTRIES 
CELL MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS 
CODE x 
NA 
HIGH RISK 40.05 
LCkl RISK 46.93 
A 
HIGH RISK 42.29 
LCkl RISK 49.00 
NA 
HIGH RISK 16.99 
LCkl RISK 17.23 
A 
HIGH RISK 17.32 
LCkl RISK 17. 76 
NA 
HIGH RISK 23. 73 
LCkl RISK 21.51 
A 
HIGH RISK 22.60 
LCkl RISK 9.14 
NA 
HIGH RISK 21.21 
LCkl RISK 22. 18 
A 
HIGH RISK 21.54 
LCkl RISK 23. 12 
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SD 
8. 76 
6.35 
8.43 
6.21 
4.66 
4.09 
4.38 
3.99 
5.31 
4.17 
5.04 
6.20 
4.27 
3.22 
3.97 
2.59 
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VARIABLE CODE x SD 
SCALE 5 NA 
PA'IHO HIGH RISK 14.98 4.18 
PA'IHO UlV RISK 16.30 3. 10 
A 
PA'IHO HIGH RISK 15.31 4.69 
PATHO UlV RISK 17.30 3.08 
SCALE 6 NA 
PA'IHO HIGH RISK 18.07 3.68 
PA'IHO UlV RISK 18.30 2.87 
A 
PATHO HIGH RISK 18.19 3.06 
PA'IHO UlV RISK 18.66 3. 11 
SCALE 7 NA 
PA'IHO HIGH RISK 23.45 3.97 
PATHO UlV RISK 23.30 3.88 
A 
PATHO HIGH RISK 23.60 3.81 
PATHO UlV RISK 24.57 2.78 
N = 347 
PATHO - COMPANY'S RISK RATING 
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